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Article
Compulsory Licensing of Patents During Pandemics
SAPNA KUMAR
Wealthy countries with major pharmaceutical industries have historically
supported strong patent rights and opposed temporarily abrogating them—even
to save lives. However, as drug shortages have become commonplace due to
COVID-19, governments have begun reassessing their views. The European
Union and various countries have issued new policies and passed legislation
facilitating their ability to provide drugs to their citizens for the duration of the
pandemic. They have signaled a willingness to do so through “compulsory
licensing,” in which the government issues a license to a third party to produce a
patented invention without the patent holder’s permission and pays the patent
holder compensation. By contrast, the United States has opposed compulsory
licensing of drugs for several decades. Although the Biden administration
supports lower-income countries seeking to license patented drugs, it remains
opposed to the practice to provide drugs for its own citizens, even during drug
shortages. This Article provides an overview of compulsory licensing and
examines the U.S. government’s inconsistent views regarding its use. It further
discusses how other high-income countries have facilitated compulsory licensing
during the pandemic. It then proposes legislative and contractual solutions for
addressing future pandemic-related drug shortages in the United States. This
includes expanding third-party manufacturers’ ability to petition for a compulsory
license and requiring companies to provide an adequate supply of patented drugs
that were developed with government funds, or else be required to license out
their technology and know-how to willing third-party manufacturers.
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Compulsory Licensing of Patents During Pandemics
SAPNA KUMAR *
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2020, an unusual dynamic arose with regard to drug access
and public health. The United States faced a critical shortage of Gilead
Sciences’ drug remdesivir, which led to doctors rationing access for hospitalized
patients.1 Meanwhile, Bangladesh-based Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd (Beximco)
reverse-engineered remdesivir and, along with other Bangladeshi manufacturers,
was able to produce a surplus.2 Driving this disparity was the fact that
remdesivir is subject to patent protection in the United States, but not in
Bangladesh.
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted an uneasy balancing act
between incentivizing new drug development through patent rights and
preventing drug shortages. Pharmaceutical research and development is
slow and expensive; it is not well-supported by temporary infusions of
public money tied to specific outbreaks.3 But the exclusive rights that
incentivize the development of needed drugs simultaneously hinder the
public’s access to them during emergencies.4
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) permits countries to contract with third-party manufacturers
to produce patented goods in exchange for the government compensating
*
John Mixon Chair in Law, Co-Director for the Institute for Intellectual Property and Information
Law, University of Houston Law Center. The author would like to thank Dan Burk, Michael Carrier,
Maggie Chon, Kristina Daugirdas, Becky Eisenburg, Dave Fagundes, Christi Guerrini, Sam Halabi,
Cynthia Ho, Paul Janicke, Orly Lobel, Nicholson Price, Arti Rai, Jerry Reichman, Ana Santos
Rutschman, Rachel Sachs, and Josh Sarnoff for their helpful suggestions. She would also like to thank
the participants of the Wiet Life Sciences Law Scholars Workshop; the Loyola Los Angeles colloquium;
the University of Iowa Innovation, Business, and Law Center’s Summer Speaker Series 2020; the 2020
IP Scholars Conference; the University of Oklahoma College of Law’s Third Mini-Conference on
Coronavirus and Law; the University of Houston Law Center Work-in-Progress Series; and the LoyolaChicago Law School’s Zoom IP Occasional Workshop.
1
Eric Boodman & Casey Ross, Doctors Lambaste Federal Process for Distributing Covid-19 Drug
Remdesivir, STAT (May 6, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/06/doctors-lambaste-federalprocess-for-distributing-covid-19-drug-remdesivir/ (discussing the remdesivir shortage in various states,
including Massachusetts and California, in May 2020).
2
See discussion infra Part III.B.
3
See Ana Santos Rutschman, IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1200,
1207 (2018) (discussing how “[t]he lengthy and costly traditional model for developing vaccines and
therapies is ill-suited to” outbreaks of diseases).
4
See id. at 1234–35; 1242–43 (providing case studies for the Zika outbreak and discussing how the
intellectual property (“IP”) rights that promoted vaccine development simultaneously hindered access).
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the patent holder—a practice known as “compulsory licensing.” Similar
rights exist under U.S. patent law.6 Compulsory licensing can be a useful
tool for countries seeking to provide drugs to their citizens during public
health emergencies.7 Admittedly, it is not a complete solution: without
“know-how” from the patent holders, complex drugs such as mRNA
vaccines may be too difficult or time-consuming for others to reproduce, and
shortages in raw materials and manufacturing capacity may also hinder drug
supplies.8 However, for at least some drugs, compulsory licensing can boost
supply and increase access.9
In light of the pandemic, several high-income countries have shifted
their positions on the use of compulsory licensing in the face of scarcity.
Various European Union (EU) member states, Canada, and other
governments passed pandemic-specific laws that provided their health
ministers with greater authority to issue compulsory licenses.10 Israel,
Hungary, and Russia issued pandemic-related compulsory licenses.11
The U.S. government’s position, however, has been less supportive.
Although it provided significant funding to private companies for
COVID-19-related drug development under Operation Warp Speed, it failed
to secure assurances that resulting drugs would be available to the public in

5

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31(h), Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS]. See also discussion infra Part II.A.
6
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a); 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2). See also discussion infra Part II.B.1.
7
See TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 31(b) (allowing member states to use patents without permission
and without attempting to obtain the patent holder’s authorization “in the case of a national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use”).
8
See JOSHUA CHOE, MATTHEW CRANE, JEREMY GREENE, JINGMIAO LONG, JOELYNN MWANGA,
JOSHUA M. SHARFSTEIN, MARIANA SOCAL & RACHEL STRODEL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., THE PANDEMIC
AND THE SUPPLY CHAIN: ADDRESSING GAPS IN PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION 1–
3 (2020), https://www.jhsph.edu/research/affiliated-programs/johns-hopkins-drug-access-and-affordability
-initiative/publications/Pandemic_Supply_Chain.pdf (discussing how shortages of active pharmaceutical
ingredients, inadequate supply chain management, and a lack of manufacturing capacity contributed to
COVID-19-related drug shortages); Lisa M. Jarvis, Scaling Up Remdesivir Amid the Coronavirus Crisis,
CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS (Apr. 20, 2020), https://cen.acs.org/biological-chemistry/infectious-disease/Scalingremdesivir-amid-coronavirus-crisis/98/web/2020/04 (noting that it typically takes nine to twelve months to
produce a retroviral and discussing the complexity of drug manufacturing). Note that small-molecule
drugs are generally easier to produce compared to biologics. Small Molecule Versus Biological Drugs,
GENERICS & BIOSIMILAR INITIATIVE (June 29, 2012), http://www.gabionline.net/Biosimilars/Research/
Small-molecule-versus-biological-drugs.
9
See discussion infra Part III.B.
10
See discussion infra Part IV.C.4.
11
See discussion infra Part IV.B. See also discussion infra Part IV.C.3; Russian Court Rejects U.S. Firm’s
Lawsuit over COVID-19 Drug Remdesivir, REUTERS (May 28, 2021, 6:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/russian-supreme-court-rejects-gilead-lawsuit-over-covid-19-drug-202
1-05-27/ (discussing the Russian Supreme Court’s affirmance of the Russian government’s issuance of a
compulsory licensing for remdesivir).
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12

sufficient quantity. Instead, the government bought priority access to
vaccines13 and prioritized securing raw materials for its needs ahead of other
countries.14 Although the Biden administration supports waiving patent right
requirements under TRIPS for COVID-19-related inventions,15 it has failed
to examine how to prevent future domestic drug shortages.
This Article compares the use of compulsory licensing for public health
emergencies in the United States versus other high-income countries, and it
considers how U.S. law and policy contributed to drug shortages. Part II
discusses compulsory licensing under TRIPS. It further explains how the
U.S. government and its contractors can produce patented goods without
permission under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and the Bayh-Dole Act. It examines how
the United States has punished countries that utilize compulsory licensing
and discusses the controversies surrounding its use. Part III then explains
how the United States procured COVID-19 drugs and provides a case study
of the 2020 remdesivir shortage.
Part IV discusses how other high-income countries facilitated compulsory
licensing during the pandemic. Part V then argues that existing U.S. law is
inadequate to safeguard public health and urges Congress to pass legislation
to make it easier for third parties to petition for licenses during drug
shortages. It proposes that U.S. agencies that fund medical research utilize
contractual provisions to ensure that a sufficient quantity of any resulting
drug be made available to the public. A public health emergency that could
impact drug supplies or a manufacturing-related drug shortage would trigger
an out-licensing obligation for the relevant patent holder, requiring it to
12
See Rutschman, supra note 3, at 1250–51 (discussing how the U.S. Army granted Sanofi an
exclusive license to a Zika vaccine candidate, but failed to secure safeguards to ensure the vaccine would
be brought to market).
13
See Keith Collins & Josh Holder, See How Rich Countries Got to the Front of the Vaccine Line,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/03/31/world/global-vaccinesupply-inequity.html (discussing how the United States and other high-income countries pre-purchased
an excess of vaccines, while lower-income countries struggled to secure doses).
14
Under Title 1 of the U.S. Defense Production Act (“DPA”), the President may require businesses
to prioritize and accept government contracts for materials and services ahead of everybody else. 50
U.S.C. § 4511 (effective Jan. 1, 2022). The Biden administration used the DPA to obtain needed materials
for manufacturing vaccines, including providing Pfizer priority access to raw materials and needed
equipment to increase its manufacturing capacity. Shayan Karbassi, Understanding Biden’s Invocation
of the Defense Production Act, LAWFARE (Mar. 4, 2021, 8:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
understanding-bidens-invocation-defense-production-act. By prioritizing the U.S. vaccine supply chain,
President Biden may have harmed other countries’ ability to obtain needed supplies. See Allison Martell
& Euan Rocha, How the U.S. Locked Up Vaccine Materials Other Nations Urgently Need, REUTERS
(May 7, 2021, 11:15 AM), https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/how-us-lockedup-vaccine-materials-other-nations-urgently-need-2021-05-07/ (noting that the U.S. government prioritized
its own vaccine manufacturers over foreign ones for vaccine components and equipment).
15
See Ashutosh Pandey, Access to COVID Vaccine Patents Is Not the Same as Access to Vaccines,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (May 6, 2021), https://www.dw.com/en/access-to-covid-vaccine-patents-is-not-thesame-as-access-to-vaccines/a-57448750 (discussing the Biden Administration’s support of a COVID-19
patent waiver and obstacles that remain regarding access to drugs).
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license out relevant technology and know-how to third-party manufacturers
until the supply is stabilized. Part VI concludes.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO GOVERNMENT USE AND COMPULSORY
LICENSING OF PATENTS
A compulsory license allows the government or a government-authorized
third party to use or manufacture a patented good, or practice a patented
process, without the patent owner’s consent.16 In exchange, the government
pays “adequate remuneration” to the patent holder.17 The patent remains in
effect, and the owner has the right to exclude other parties from using it.18
TRIPS Article 31(b) expressly permits countries to enact national laws
authorizing compulsory licensing.19
The United States has two statutes that allow U.S. agencies and their
contractors to produce drugs without patent-holder permission: 28 U.S.C. §
1498 and the Bayh-Dole Act. The United States has used patents without
permission to obtain cheap drugs, and it regularly uses defense-related
patents without permission.20 Nevertheless, the U.S. government frequently
retaliates against low- and middle-income countries that issue compulsory
licenses, even during public health crises.21
Section A discusses TRIPS provisions regarding compulsory licensing.
Section B examines the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and the Bayh-Dole Act.
It discusses instances when the United States has used patents without
permission or threatened to do so to obtain a discount. It further examines
how the U.S. government has threatened countries that utilized compulsory
16
See Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2021)
(stating “[c]ompulsory licensing is when a government allows someone else to produce a patented
product or process without the consent of the patent owner or plans to use the patent-protected invention
itself”); CYNTHIA M. HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 127 (2011) [hereinafter HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE]
(noting “[a] compulsory license permits a nation (or a third party authorized by the nation) to use a
patented invention without permission of the patent owner in exchange for payment of a governmentdetermined royalty”).
17
Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, supra note 16.
18
Id.
19
TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 31.
20
See infra Part II.C.
21
The U.S. government’s approach could be due to the significant influence the pharmaceutical
industry wields—pharmaceuticals and health products are the top lobbying forces in the United States. See
Leading Lobbying Industries in the United States in 2020, by Total Lobbying Spending, STATISTA
(Jan. 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/257364/top-lobbying-industries-in-the-us/ (showing that
the pharmaceutical and health product industry spent $306.23 million in 2020, as compared to $156.9
million spent by the electronics manufacturing and equipment industry). This high level of spending dates
back decades. Olivier J. Wouters, Lobbying Expenditures and Campaign Contributions by the
Pharmaceutical and Health Product Industry in the United States, 1999-2018, 180 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
INTERNAL MED. 688 (2020).
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licensing for public health purposes. Section C then considers why
compulsory licensing is viewed as controversial by some scholars.
A. Government Use and Compulsory Licensing Under TRIPS
TRIPS is a multilateral agreement that came into force in 1995, binding
164 member states including the United States.22 It provides minimum
standards for patent protection and is enforceable through the World Trade
Organization’s (WTO’s) dispute process. 23 Because TRIPS links patent
and other intellectual property (IP) protection to trade, 24 countries that fail
to adopt its minimal standards risk being shut out of lucrative markets,
such as that of the United States. Consequently, countries that once
provided little or no patent protection for drugs were forced to expand
patent rights. 25
TRIPS Article 31(b) provides members with a right to invoke national
laws permitting the government to use patented inventions without
permission and to issue a compulsory license authorizing a third party to
practice the patented invention. 26 Such use must relate to a public interest,
counter anticompetitive conduct, or be for noncommercial government
use. 27 Generally, a member must first attempt to obtain an agreement from
22
Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS [Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights] in the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm
(last visited Aug. 9, 2021); Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
23
See Ruth L. Okediji, Legal Innovation in International Intellectual Property Relations: Revisiting
Twenty-One Years of the TRIPS Agreement, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 191, 202–03, 206 (2014) (noting that
TRIPS raised minimum standards of IP protection, including making broad changes in international
patent law, and provided a means for resolving disputes); Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or
Balancing?: Separating Strands of Fact from Fiction Under TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
371, 384 n.45 (2009) [hereinafter Ho, Breaking or Balancing] (discussing the WTO dispute resolution
process); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round:
Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 277 (1997) (discussing the
significance of TRIPS creating a mechanism for enforcing IP disputes among nations).
24
See Srividhya Ragavan, PATENT AND TRADE DISPARITIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 63–64
(2012) (noting how TRIPS linked IP to trade for the first time). Note that forty-six Least-Developed
Countries are currently exempt from the drug patent requirements under TRIPS. Least Developed
Countries (LDCs), UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developedcountry-category.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2021); WTO Members Agree to Extend Drug Patent
Exemption for Poorest Members, WORLD TRADE O RG. (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.wto.org/english/
news_e/news15_e/trip_06nov15_e.htm.
25
See Okediji, supra note 23, at 227–30 (discussing how Brazil and India strengthened patent
protection for pharmaceuticals because of TRIPS).
26
See TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 31 (providing conditions for permitting the unauthorized use of
patents “by the government or third parties authorized by the government”). See also Ho, Breaking or
Balancing, supra note 23, at 395 (observing that the preamble of Article 31 “permits nations to issue
compulsory licenses not only for governmental manufacture of patented inventions, but also for a
government authorized third party”).
27
TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 31(b); Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented
Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 248 (2009) (discussing
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the patent holder “on reasonable commercial terms.” However, during “a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,” the
member need only notify the patent holder “as soon as reasonably
practicable.”29 TRIPS places no restrictions on the types of inventions that
can be subject to a compulsory license. 30
Article 31(f) states that any use of a patent without permission “shall
be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the
Member authorizing such use.”31 This provision originally prohibited
countries from using compulsory licenses to produce medicines for export,
which disadvantaged countries that lacked the means for producing needed
drugs domestically.32 The WTO subsequently adopted the 2001 Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which
emphasized that TRIPS supports “WTO members’ right to protect public
health” and “promote access to medicines for all.”33 The Doha Declaration
reiterated that members have a broad right to determine the grounds upon
which a compulsory license is granted and clarified that “public health
crises . . . can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency.”34 It further directed the TRIPS Council to find a solution
for low-income members that lacked the resources to produce their own
drugs under license. 35
Two years later, the WTO created a waiver to Article 31(f) that
permitted members to issue compulsory licenses to export drugs to
countries that asked for permission; the waiver was subsequently codified
under TRIPS Article 31bis. 36 However, the United States, EU member
states, and many others opted out of the ability to import drugs

how governments may “grant compulsory licenses on virtually any ground—including public interest,
abuse or anti-competitive conduct, or for noncommercial government use”).
28
TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 31(b).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 31(f).
32
See Reichman, supra note 27, at 248 (noting that, although Article 31 allowed developing
countries to issue compulsory licenses, “most of these countries lacked the capacity to manufacture the
drugs in question, or otherwise to obtain the key active ingredients,” making Article 31 “an empty
gesture”).
33
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 31bis.
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manufactured in other countries under a compulsory license. These
countries would need to take steps to opt back in.38
When compulsory licensing safeguards were incorporated into TRIPS,
the goal was to lessen the negative impact of patent rights on public health in
low- and middle-income countries. However, since that time, there has been
growing awareness that compulsory licensing can be a valuable tool for
wealthy countries with mature patent systems.39 Moreover, if high-income
countries were to purchase drugs that were produced under licenses from these
countries, it would improve economies of scale and could lead to lower drug
costs for everyone.40
B. The U.S. Approach to Compulsory Licenses for Safeguarding Public Health
The U.S. government once ignored patent rights when entering into
drug-procurement contracts. However, as the pharmaceutical industry grew
and became more influential, federal agencies stopped manufacturing and
importing drugs without permission. Instead, the United States began
punishing countries that lawfully used compulsory licensing under TRIPS.
Although the Biden administration has signaled support for compulsory
licensing in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is unclear whether
future administrations will be as supportive.

37
Ed Silverman, Wealthy Nations Urged to Embrace WTO Deal and Import Meds Made Under
Compulsory Licenses, STAT (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/04/07/wtocompulsory-licensing-covid19-coronavirus-patents/. See also Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H.
Reichman, Facilitating Access to Cross-Border Supplies of Patented Pharmaceuticals: The Case of the
COVID-19 Pandemic, 23 J. INT’L ECON. L. 535, 558–60 (2020) (describing the opt out by high-income
countries as “a misguided effort to protect the commercial interests of their pharmaceutical companies
notwithstanding the most severe public health emergencies”). Note that the EU Commissioner for Trade,
Phil Hogan, has stated that the EU is open to changing its status to allow it to import drugs under
compulsory license. See Letter from Phil Hogan, Member of the Eur. Trade Comm’n, to Bernd Lange,
Chairman of the Comm. on Int’l Trade for the Eur. Parliament (May 26, 2020),
https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Van-Brempt-2.pdf.
38
See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 37, 559–60 (2020) (discussing the different ways that
countries could opt back in to being able to import drugs made under compulsory license); see also James
Love, Open Letter Asking 37 WTO Members to Declare Themselves Eligible to Import Medicines
Manufactured Under Compulsory License in Another Country, Under 31bis of TRIPS Agreement,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.keionline.org/32707 (urging countries that
opted out of importing drugs manufactured under compulsory license to reverse their positions).
39
See Kyung-Bok Son, Importance of the Intellectual Property System in Attempting Compulsory
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals: A Cross-Sectional Analysis, 15 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH 42, 43–44
(2019) (discussing the positive role that compulsory licensing can play in developed countries with
established patent systems).
40
See Carlos M. Correa, TRIPS Agreement and Access to Drugs in Developing Countries, 2 SUR
INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 25, 35 (2005) (noting the problem that small, poor countries face in producing drugs
under compulsory license with economies of scale).

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

66

[Vol. 54:1

1. U.S. Legal Landscape for Third-Party Patent Use
The United States has two major statutes that address government and
third-party use of patented inventions without patent-holder permission. First,
28 U.S.C. § 1498 provides “reasonable and entire compensation” to patent
holders whose inventions are used by the government or its contractors.41
Second, the Bayh-Dole Act provides agencies that fund research resulting in
patents with “march-in rights,” and it theoretically permits third parties to
apply for a compulsory license.42 The government may also facilitate drug
production by utilizing the Defense Production Act (DPA) to acquire raw
materials and obtain access to manufacturing facilities.43
a. 28 U.S.C. § 1498
Until the early twentieth century, no statute permitted patent holders to
sue the United States for patent infringement.44 The government enjoys
sovereign immunity under the U.S. Constitution and cannot be sued without
its “unequivocally expressed” consent.45 In 1894, the Supreme Court held
that because the government had not waived its immunity for tort actions, it
could not be sued for patent infringement.46 Between 1910 and 1918,
Congress passed legislation consenting to suit for direct,47 and later indirect,
patent infringement.48 The early legislation was shaped by World War I,
with a 1918 Act extending immunity to third-party contractors to ensure that
the government could procure needed equipment.49
In 1948, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which remains in effect
today.50 This statute grants patent holders a limited right to sue the U.S.
government for patent infringement for “reasonable and entire compensation
41

28 U.S.C. § 1498.
An Act to Amend the Patent and Trademark Laws (Bayh-Dole Act), Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat.
3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211, 301–307).
43
50 U.S.C. § 4511 (effective Jan. 1, 2022).
44
See Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Robert F. Allnutt, Patent Infringement in Government
Procurement: A Remedy Without a Right?, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5, 6-7 (1966) (noting that, prior to
1910, no suit could be brought for patent infringement by the United States due to its failure to consent
to being sued for patent infringement). For a detailed history of the government use of patented
inventions under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, see Christopher J. Morten & Charles Duan, Who’s Afraid of
Section 1498? A Case for Government Patent Use in Pandemics and Other National Crises, 23 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 1, 4–13 (2020).
45
United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992).
46
Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 169 (1894).
47
Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1498). See also Crozier
v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290, 304–05 (1912) (discussing the scope of the Act of June
25, 1910).
48
Act of July 1, 1918, ch. 114, 40 Stat. 705 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1498). See also
Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 343–44 (1928) (noting the statute was
amended to shield government contractors from patent infringement liability).
49
Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 275 U.S. at 345.
50
28 U.S.C. § 1498.
42
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51

for such use and manufacture” of the patented invention. The government
may therefore procure goods of any sort at a lower price, regardless of whether
there is an emergency.52 All § 1498 cases must be filed in the United States
Court of Federal Claims, which does not offer jury trials.53 Patent owners cannot
obtain prospective relief,54 so contractors are free to continue using the patent
on the government’s behalf, so long as the government pays compensation.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal
Circuit) and the precursor of the Court of Federal Claims both cautioned that
§ 1498’s remedy is “not completely analogous” to those under the Patent
Act.55 Nevertheless, courts rely on case law from the Patent Act, applying
the Georgia-Pacific factors for assessing a reasonable royalty.56 The Federal
Circuit further maintains that “lost profits should be recoverable in at least
some infringement actions against the government,”57 though such awards
appear to be uncommon.58 The amount of compensation that the patent
51
Id. This right extends to assignees and exclusive licensees. See Lionel Marks Lavenue, Patent
Infringement Against the United States and Government Contractors Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 in the United
States Court of Federal Claims, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 389, 420 n.166 (1995) (discussing relevant cases).
52
See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting TVI
Energy Corp. v. Blane, 806 F.2d 1057, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (noting § 1498 remains broad enough “so as
not to limit the Government’s freedom in procurement by considerations of private patent infringement”).
53
Suits against the U.S. government must be brought in the United States Court of Federal Claims,
which does not offer jury trials. 28 U.S.C. § 1498. See also Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If
Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1717 (2013) (noting that “trials in the Court of Claims are to
judges, not juries, even though [under 28 U.S.C. § 1498] damages are the only remedy available”).
54
See Coakwell v. United States, 372 F.2d 508, 511 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (noting § 1498 was enacted “for
the purpose of enabling the Government to purchase goods for the performance of its functions without
the threat of having the supplier enjoined from selling patented goods to the Government”); TVI Energy,
806 F.2d at 1059–60 (observing that legislative history supports that the purpose of § 1498 “was to relieve
private Government contractors from expensive litigation with patentees, possible injunctions, payment
of royalties, and punitive damages,” and holding that § 1498 immunity extends to a competitor for a
government contract). See also LiLan Ren, Comment, A Comparison of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(A) and Foreign
Statutes and an Analysis of § 1498(A)’s Compliance with TRIPS, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1659, 1665 (2005)
(discussing the broad reach of § 1498); Paul Janicke, Current State of U.S. Patent Law Regarding
Infringement of Drug Patents by the Government, UNIV. HOUS. L. CTR. (Dec. 7, 2001),
https://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/Food/011207Current.html (noting the provision’s
“requirements for ‘authorization or consent’ by the government are quick and virtually automatic in
practice” and do not entail any formalities).
55
Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Leesona Corp.
v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 968 (Ct. Cl. 1979)).
56
Id. at 1580 (applying Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and aff’d, 446 F.2d 295, 302 (2d Cir. 1971)). In Georgia-Pacific, the district
court created fifteen factors to guide the court in computing reasonable royalty damages for patent
infringement. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
57
Gargoyles, Inc., 113 F.3d at 1576. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d
1152 (6th Cir. 1978), established four factors that a patent holder must prove for the court to award lost
profits under 35 U.S.C. § 284 on sales that the patent holder would have made but for the infringement.
The factors include: “(1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of acceptable noninfringing
substitutes, (3) his manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of
the profit he would have made.” Id. at 1156.
58
See Morten & Duan, supra note 44, at 44 (discussing the availability of lost profits).
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holder receives through this process is generally less than what the Patent
Act allows.59
The attitude of the U.S. government towards using patents without
permission has varied dramatically over the years. In the 1930s and 1940s,
the government sometimes considered whether a bidder for a government
contract had permission to use patented technology.60 From the late 1950s
through at least the 1960s, however, some U.S. agencies did not consider
patent rights in evaluating bids for goods or services,61 leading the government
to import patented drugs like tetracycline merely to reduce costs.62
In the early 2000s, after several people received anthrax in the mail, the
government sought to procure a supply of Bayer’s ciprofloxacin antibiotic.63
The drug cost $4.67 per tablet wholesale and $5 to $7 per tablet retail,
although Bayer offered to sell it to the government for $1.75 to $1.83 per
tablet.64 People began pressuring the U.S. government to utilize § 1498,
including Senator Chuck Schumer.65 During this time, Canada licensed a
domestic company to manufacture the drug without Bayer’s permission66
59
Under the Patent Act, someone who willfully infringes a patent may be forced to pay up to treble
damages and attorney fees. 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–285 (noting in § 284 that “the court may increase the
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed,” and authorizing in § 285 that “[t]he court in
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party”). That is not available
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
60
See Comptroller Gen. McCarl to the Sec’y of Com., 13 Comp. Gen. 173 (1933) (noting that, if
the use of a valid patent is required to manufacture supplies for the U.S. government, “bidders properly
may be required to show legal right to use the patents”); Mossinghoff & Allnut, supra note 44, at 761
(discussing statements by the Comptroller General in 1933 and 1944 regarding patent rights).
61
See Mossinghoff & Allnutt, supra note 44, at 762 (writing in 1966 that a then-present policy of
agencies not considering patent infringement liability in evaluating contract bids or proposals was first
established in 1958); Hannah Brennan, Amy Kapczynski, Christine H. Monahan & Zain Rizvi, A
Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 275, 304 (2016) (discussing how there were “multiple federal agencies deliberately
‘purchas[ing] certain drug products covered by U.S. product and process patents, from unlicensed sources
for use in the United States in deliberate violation of these patents’”) (quoting Patent Infringement:
Hearing on S. 1047 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, & Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 15 (1965)).
62
In the late 1950s, the U.S. Military Medical Supply Agency (“MMSA”) concluded that the price
of tetracycline was too high at $17.25 per bottle and entered into an agreement with an Italian firm to
produce it for $8.50 per bottle. MILTON M. SILVERMAN & PHILIP R. LEE, PILLS, PROFITS, AND POLITICS
187 (1974). The authors note that, in about three years, MMSA utilized § 1498 “for approximately fifty
drug purchases, saving American taxpayers roughly $21 million.” Id. Note that, at the time, Italy did not
offer patents for drugs. Brennan et al., supra note 61, at 304–05.
63
See Lody Petersen & Robert Pear, A Nation Challenged: CIPRO; Anthrax Fears Send Demand
for a Drug Far Beyond Output, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2001, at A1.
64
See Keith Bradsher & Edmund L. Andrews, A Nation Challenged: CIPRO; U.S. Says Bayer Will
Cut Cost of Its Anthrax Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2001, at B7 (discussing how the United States’
successful negotiation with Bayer came immediately after Canada issued a compulsory license and used
it as leverage).
65
Morten & Duan, supra note 44, at 27.
66
Patent Protection Versus Public Health, 358 LANCET 1563, 1563 (2001).
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and subsequently negotiated with Bayer a price of $1.30 per tablet.67
Meanwhile, Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson
initially refused to “break” Bayer’s patent, claiming that it was not legal.68
But he later reversed course, threatening to buy generic ciprofloxacin and
maintaining that he would ask Congress to legislatively deny Bayer any
compensation.69 Consequently, the day after the Canadian arrangement was
made, the U.S. government succeeded in negotiating a price of $0.95 per
tablet for an order of 100 million tablets.70 Although § 1498 was not used in
the end, Bayer admitted that the threat of compulsory licensing motivated it
to reach a voluntary agreement.71
During the Avian Flu outbreak of 2005, some members of Congress,
including Senator Schumer, called for the government to utilize § 1498 to
alleviate a shortage of Roche’s Tamiflu.72 The Congressional Research
Service reported that “[t]he threat of compulsory licensing (or imposing
other legal limitations on Roche’s patent rights) may have played a role in
persuading Roche” to license Tamiflu to nineteen generic manufacturers to
increase the supply.73
Although the government has not licensed drug patents without
permission for several decades, it frequently does so for defense technology.
In FastShip, LLC v. United States, the Court of Federal Claims awarded
approximately $7.8 million in attorneys’ fees, following a $12.36 million
damages award, for the U.S. Navy’s infringement of the company’s ship
patents.74 In Hitkansut LLC v. United States, the Federal Circuit affirmed
67
See id. (noting Bayer responded to Canada overriding its patent “by donating a large amount of
Cipro to Canada, and promising more in the event of an emergency, which led the Canadian government
to agree to acquire ciprofloxacin exclusively from Bayer for the duration of the patent agreement”).
68
Morten & Duan, supra note 44, at 30.
69
Bradsher & Andrews, supra note 64.
70
See id. (noting that the day after Canada secured a $1.30 per tablet price, the U.S. government
succeeded in negotiating a $0.95 per tablet price); Fred Charatan, Bayer Cuts Price of Ciprofloxacin After
Bush Threatens to Buy Generics, 323 BMJ 1023, 1023 (2001) (discussing Bayer’s agreement “to sell
100 million tablets of ciprofloxacin to the government at [$0.95]” per tablet).
71
See Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, Registration Statement Pursuant to Section 12(b) or 12(g) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 20FR12B/A) (Jan. 14, 2002) (discussing how Canada and the
United States contemplated using compulsory licensing, leading to Bayer reaching an agreement to
provide ciprofloxacin “while preserving our existing patent rights”).
72
Press Release, Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Senator for New York, As Avian Flu Closes In on U.S.,
Schumer Calls for Immediate Action: Demands Suspension of Tamiflu Patent so Vaccine Can Be MassProduced, Dramatically Increasing Supply (Aug. 1, 2006), https://www.schumer.senate.gov/newsroom/
press-releases/as-avian-flu-closes-in-on-us-schumer-calls-for-immediate-action-demands-suspension-of
-tamiflu-patent-so-vaccine-can-be-mass-produced-dramatically-increasing-supply. See CONG. RSCH.
SERV., RL33159, INFLUENZA ANTIVIRAL DRUGS AND PATENT LAW ISSUES (2007) (noting that, “[i]n
response to the heightened demand for the drug, as well as faced with threatened abrogation of its patent
rights by U.S. politicians and government officials in other countries,” Roche voluntarily licensed its
Tamiflu patents).
73
CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 72, at 9.
74
153 Fed. Cl. 215, 219–20 (2021).
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approximately $4.4 million in attorneys’ fees, following a $200,000 damages
award, for Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s unauthorized use of Hitkansut’s
patented method.75 Because the government need not notify patent holders
when it uses patents without permission, patent holders may not realize when
their patents are being infringed. Consequently, one can only guess how
widespread the government’s practice of licensing defense-related inventions
without permission is. Moreover, defense contractors that frequently do
business with the U.S. government may be reluctant to sue for compensation.
In recent years, scholars and elected officials have proposed utilizing
§ 1498 to lower U.S. drug prices. Amy Kapczynski and Aaron S. Kesselheim
proposed that the government authorize hepatitis C antiviral drugs for
Medicaid patients.76 In 2018, Representative Lloyd Doggett and Senator
Sherrod Brown introduced legislation that would permit the government to
negotiate with pharmaceutical companies for drugs covered under Medicare
and issue compulsory licenses when voluntary agreements could not be
reached.77 Although the legislation had support from 104 House Democrats,78
it failed to gain traction among House Republicans, and conservative
commentators denounced it.79 Indeed, during a Senate committee hearing, the
United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary
Alex Azar referred to the practice as “socialist compulsory licensing,”80
notwithstanding the U.S. government’s regular use of it for defense purposes.
b. The Bayh-Dole Act
Prior to 1980, government agencies lacked a consistent position on
whether to allow federal grant recipients to patent their resulting

75
958 F.3d 1162, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Hitkansut LLC v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. 353, 394
(2017), aff’d without opinion, 721 F. App’x 992, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
76
Amy Kapczynski & Aaron S. Kesselheim, ‘Government Patent Use’: A Legal Approach to
Reducing Drug Spending, 35 HEALTH AFFS. 791, 792 (2016) (noting that the government could utilize §
1498 to lower the price of hepatitis C drugs for Medicaid patients).
77
See Rena M. Conti & Paul Kleutghen, Is ‘Competitive Licensing’ Proposed in HR 1046
Practical for Lowering Drug Prices?, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (July 29, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org
/do/10.1377/hblog20190724.85223/ (discussing HR 1046).
78
Medicare Negotiation and Competitive Licensing Act of 2018, H.R. 6505, 115th Cong. (2018).
79
See, e.g., Elizabeth Wright, Compulsory Pharmaceutical Licensing Is Little More Than
Government Theft, HILL (Aug. 4, 2018, 7:05 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/400415compulsory-pharmaceutical-licensing-is-little-more-than-government-theft (characterizing compulsory
licensing as “government theft”); Peter J. Pitts, Doggett-Brown Bill Destroys Drug Innovation,
INSIDESOURCES (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.insidesources.com/doggett-brown-bill-destroys-druginnovation/ (maintaining, as FDA Associate Commissioner for External Relations under President
George W. Bush, that HR 1046 would harm innovation).
80
James Love, Hits and Misses from the Senate HELP Committee Hearing on the President’s
Blueprint for Lower Drug Prices, BILL OF HEALTH (June 14, 2018), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu
/2018/06/14/hits-and-misses-from-the-senate-help-committee-hearing-on-the-presidents-blueprint-for-lowerdrug-prices/.
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81

inventions. The Bayh-Dole Act authorized the commercialization and
patenting of such inventions.82 Funding recipients must comply with various
requirements, such as providing a detailed disclosure of the invention to the
funding agency and notifying the agency if it plans to seek a patent.83 This
allows the agency to determine whether “exceptional circumstances” exist,
meriting government use of the patent.84 If proper disclosures are not made,
the agency can obtain title to the invention.85
The funding agency retains “march-in rights” for resulting patented
inventions, which allows it to license the invention “upon terms that are
reasonable under the circumstances” in several situations.86 For example, it
may grant a license if the patent holder “has not taken, or is not expected to
take within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical
application,”87 with “practical application” requiring that the invention’s
“benefits are . . . available to the public on reasonable terms.”88 It may also
grant a license if “necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not
reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or their licensees.”89
The funding agency’s right is a “nonexclusive, nontransferable,
irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or on behalf of
the United States any subject invention throughout the world.”90
Consequently, the government and its contractors need not pay the patent
holder royalties.91 This is different from § 1498, which allows the patent
81

See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1671–91 (1996) (reviewing the
history of patenting government-sponsored research).
82
An Act to Amend the Patent and Trademark Laws (Bayh-Dole Act), Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat.
3015, 3019 (1980). Note that, although the Bayh-Dole Act initially permitted only small businesses and
nonprofit organizations to commercialize inventions resulting from government-funded research, such
permission later expanded to all businesses by executive order. Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 1665.
83
35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1); 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(c)(1)–(2) (2021).
84
35 U.S.C. § 202(a).
85
37 C.F.R. § 401.14(d)(1) (2021).
86
35 U.S.C. § 203(a).
87
Id. § 203(a)(1).
88
Id. § 201(f). Some commentators have argued that this section allows the government to march
in if the subject invention is offered to the public at an unreasonable price. See Gerald Barnett, Bayh-Dole
Basics, 8: Reasonable Terms, RSCH. ENTER. (May 29, 2019), https://researchenterprise.org/2019/05/29/
bayh-dole-basics-8-reasonable-terms/ (noting “the terms on which the public has access to benefits
necessarily must include price—arguably non-discriminatory and non-exploitative pricing”); Peter S.
Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls? The Unrecognized and
Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed upon Patents Deriving in Whole or in Part from
Federally Funded Research, 75 TULANE L. REV. 631, 650–53 (2001) (maintaining that “reasonable
terms” in the Bayh-Dole Act includes price).
89
35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2).
90
Id. § 202(c)(4).
91
See id. (noting that the government’s nonexclusive license is “paid-up”); WENDY H. SCHACHT,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32076, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: SELECTED ISSUES IN PATENT POLICY AND THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY 16 (2012) (noting that 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) provides the
government with a royalty-free license).
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owner to sue for compensation. However, the royalty-free license only
applies to inventions that the government helped fund; it does not
automatically attach to other related patents.92 Furthermore, a third party that
petitions an agency for march-in rights would still be obligated to pay
compensation “upon terms that are reasonable under the circumstances.”93
The Bayh-Dole Act was supposed to strike a balance—“promot[ing] the
utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or
development” while “protect[ing] the public against nonuse or unreasonable
use of inventions.”94 By permitting universities to partner with private
biotechnology companies, Congress may have helped bring more new drugs
to market.95 However, the Bayh-Dole Act has contributed to “[t]he blurring
of the boundary between commercial and noncommercial research.”96 It has
forced the public to pay for inventions twice: first by funding government
research grants through taxation and then by purchasing the resulting
inventions at inflated prices because of patent protection and the domestic
manufacturing requirement.97 If patents are supposed to incentivize research,
it is unclear why the public should fund the underlying research and absorb
the risk.98
March-in rights are generally unsuitable for public-health emergencies.
To date, no agency has been willing to exercise them, even during drug
shortages.99 The petitioning process is too cumbersome for agencies and

92

SCHACHT, supra note 91, at 16.
35 U.S.C. § 203(a). See JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44597, MARCH-IN RIGHTS
UNDER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 8 (2016), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44597.pdf (noting that march-in
rights recipients “would presumably pay royalties to the patent proprietor”).
94
35 U.S.C. § 200.
95
See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Bayh-Dole Beyond Borders, 4 J.L. &
BIOSCIENCES 282, 288–89 (2017) (discussing the commercialization theory supporting Bayh-Dole).
96
Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain,
2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 86.
97
See Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776, 796
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (maintaining that legal rules must produce some community benefit under
Bayh-Dole because, otherwise, “[w]hy should the public have to pay twice for the same invention?”);
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership, and
Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1194 (2000) (discussing how the public pays twice under
Bayh-Dole); see also Okediji, supra note 23, at 211 n.81 (maintaining that Bayh-Dole is “arguably . . .
an impermissible subsidy under the GATT rules”).
98
See Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 1668–69 (suggesting that because the public has paid for the underlying
research and absorbed the risk, perhaps the resulting inventions should pass into the public domain).
99
See THOMAS, supra note 93, at 8-10 (discussing six unsuccessful march-in rights petitions from
third parties). There are some reports of the government threatening to use march-in rights to obtain a
license for a third party. See JAMES PACKARD LOVE, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, RECENT EXAMPLES
OF THE USE OF COMPULSORY LICENSES ON PATENTS (2007); Memorandum of Understanding, UNIV. OF
WIS . (Sept. 5, 2001), https://news.wisc.edu/memorandum-of-understanding/ (claiming that HSS used the
threat of using march-in rights to get the University of Wisconsin to license out patents on stem-cell lines).
93
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100

involves a detailed hearing for the patent holder.
Moreover, if the
license-seeker were to prevail, the agency’s determination would not take
effect until the contractor exhausted all appeals,101 which could take years.
2. U.S. Reaction to Foreign Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents
For years, the U.S. government strongly opposed the compulsory
licensing of pharmaceuticals. Republican and Democratic administrations
threatened countries seeking to use them with trade sanctions and
maintained that it undermines TRIPS’s minimum protections.102 U.S.
pharmaceutical companies have also retaliated against countries that license
their drugs.103
For example, South Africa passed the Medicines and Related Substances
Control Amendment Act of 1997 to improve access to essential medicines
through methods including compulsory licensing and parallel importation.104 At
the time, a three-drug cocktail for treating HIV patients cost between $10,000 and
$15,000 a year, but Indian generic manufacturer Cipla produced it for
substantially less.105 The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South
Africa and forty-one pharmaceutical companies sued, claiming that South Africa
was violating TRIPS,106 notwithstanding the permissibility of compulsory
100
See 37 C.F.R. § 401.6(e) (2021) (providing the procedural requirements for utilizing marchin rights, including a factfinding hearing that “should afford the contractor the opportunity to appear
with counsel, submit documentary evidence, present witnesses and confront such persons as the
agency may present”).
101
35 U.S.C. § 203(b); see also Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the
Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 294 (2003) (noting that “the Bayh-Dole Act
seriously limits the value of march-in rights as a mechanism for achieving prompt dissemination by
deferring such rights from taking effect pending elaborate administrative proceedings and exhaustion of
court appeals”).
102
See, e.g., HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE, supra note 16, at 151 (discussing how the United States
retaliated against Thailand’s use of compulsory licenses under both the W. Bush and Obama administrations).
103
See id. at 149–50 (discussing how Abbott retaliated against Thailand after it issued a compulsory
license on Kaletra); WILLIAM W. FISHER III & TALHA SYED, Chapter 6: Sticks, in INFECTION: THE
HEALTH CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 8 (Jan. 18, 2020)
(available at http://ccb.ff6.mwp.accessdomain.com/P/Infection.htm) (observing that “the pharmaceutical
firms disadvantaged by compulsory licenses and the governments of the countries in which those firms
are based sometimes retaliate (or threaten to retaliate) against the countries that use them”).
104
See Heinz Klug, Access to Medicines and the Transformation of the South African State:
Exploring the Interactions of Legal and Policy Changes in Health, Intellectual Property, Trade, and
Competition Law in the Context of South Africa’s HIV/AIDS Pandemic, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 297,
314 (2012) (discussing the legislation); see also The Price of Africa’s Cheap Drugs, ECONOMIST (Apr.
19, 2001), http://www.economist.com/node/578891 (noting that South Africa was negotiating with
Indian generic manufacturer Cipla to cheaply obtain AIDS drugs).
105
See Katherine Eban, How an Indian Tycoon Fought Big Pharma to Sell AIDS Drugs for $1 a
Day, QUARTZ INDIA (July 15, 2019), https://qz.com/india/1666032/how-indian-pharma-giant-ciplamade-aids-drugs-affordable/ (discussing how Cipla is able to sell generic AIDS drugs for significantly
less than the name-brand versions).
106
Notice of Motion, Pharm. Mrfs.’ Ass’n of S. Afr. v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 1998,
Case Number 4183/98 (S. Afr.), http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharmasuit.html.
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licensing under Article 31(b). Three U.S. companies—Bristol-Myers Squibb;
Merck & Co., Inc.; and Eli Lilly and Company—participated in the litigation.107
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
asked the U.S. trade representative to place South Africa under the Special
301 Review, characterizing South Africa as “a ‘test case’ for those who
oppose the U.S. government’s long-standing commitment to improve the
terms of protection for all forms of American intellectual property, including
pharmaceutical patents.”108 The Clinton administration’s U.S. trade
representative subsequently placed South Africa on the Special 301 Report’s
Watch List for two years in a row, putting its request for preferential tariff
treatment on hold and later subjecting it to an out-of-cycle review.109
Remarkably, the 1999 Report singled out South Africa for choosing to
organize with other countries to support the use of compulsory licensing of
pharmaceuticals under TRIPS.110
The U.S. government and other high-income countries’ actions sparked
public backlash. Thousands protested in support of South Africa, and both
the EU and the World Health Organization expressed support.111 The
pharmaceutical companies involved in the lawsuit subsequently conceded
that South Africa’s law complied with TRIPS and eventually dropped suit.112
President Clinton subsequently issued an executive order stating that the
U.S. government would not seek the revocation of any law or policy of a
sub-Saharan African country that was attempting to expand access to
HIV/AIDS drugs for impacted areas.113
107

Id. at para. 2.4.
What Is the U.S. Role in Combating the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crim. Just., Drug Pol’y, & Hum. Res. of the Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th Cong. 106–
26 (1999); id. app. B at 163 (providing, according to its title, a “Timeline of Disputes over Compulsory
Licensing and Parallel Importation in South Africa”).
109
OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, 1998 SPECIAL 301
REPORT 1, 15, 21 (1998); OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, 1999
SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1–2, 14, 22 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 SPECIAL 301 REPORT]; see also William W.
Fisher III & Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The South Africa AIDS Controversy: A Case Study in Patent Law and
Policy, LAW & BUS. OF PATENTS 1, 7 (2005), https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf
(discussing the United States’ use of the Special 301 Watch List to pressure South Africa, and noting that
this move brought South Africa “one step closer to the imposition of unilateral trade sanctions”); Sapna
Kumar, Innovation Nationalism, 51 CONN. L. REV. 205, 240 (2019) (discussing the Clinton administration’s
actions against South Africa).
110
See 1999 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 109, at 22 (maintaining that “South African
representatives have led a faction” of countries “in calling for a reduction in the level of protection
provided for pharmaceuticals in TRIPS”); see also Klug, supra note 104, at 315 (observing that the USTR
had a problem with the patent protection in South Africa, as well as with the position it took in the global
debate regarding the scope of TRIPS).
111
Rachel L. Swarns, Drug Makers Drop South Africa Suit over AIDS Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
20, 2001, at A6.
112
Id. As the then-CEO of GlaxoSmithKlein noted, “We’re a very major corporation. We’re not
insensitive to public opinion. That is a factor in our decision-making.” Id.
113
Exec. Order No. 13,155, 3 C.F.R. 13,155 (2001).
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Although pharmaceutical interest groups such as PhRMA and the
Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO) continue to characterize
compulsory licensing as harmful,114 the United States has begun to shift its
position. In a surprising move, the Biden administration announced support for a
TRIPS waiver of COVID-19-related patents for the duration of the pandemic.115
Although such a waiver is far from certain, the support signifies that the Biden
administration might be willing to tolerate compulsory licensing in the future
when it is used by lower-income countries to produce lifesaving drugs.
C. The Debate over Compulsory Licensing During Public Health Emergencies
There is an ongoing debate regarding whether compulsory licensing
should be utilized during public health emergencies. Points of disagreement
include what the scope of TRIPS Article 31 is, whether compulsory licensing
is helpful to low-income countries, and whether the practice is ethical.
1. What Is the Scope of TRIPS Article 31?
One point of disagreement is how broadly TRIPS Article 31 protects
compulsory licensing. Some low-income countries use compulsory licensing
to offset high drug prices,116 and others claim that TRIPS permits working
requirements that require patent holders to domestically produce patented
goods.117 Pharmaceutical industry groups, however, seek sanctions against
countries that use compulsory licensing to deal with drug prices.118 They also
maintain that Article 27(1) prohibits working requirements and observe that
the practice increases the cost of producing patented products.119
2. Does Compulsory Licensing Help Low-Income Countries?
Some groups argue that compulsory licensing does not help low-income
countries. Conservative commentators and pharmaceutical lobby groups
114
See BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORG., SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 9 (2021) (criticizing
various governments’ use and support of compulsory licensing); PHARM. RSCH. & MFRS. OF AM.,
SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 2 (2020) [hereinafter PHRMA SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION] (characterizing
compulsory licensing as a “harmful practice[]”).
115
Amy Maxmen, In Shock Move, US Backs Waiving Patents on COVID Vaccines, NATURE (May
6, 2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-01224-3.
116
RAGAVAN, supra note 24, at 72.
117
See HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE, supra note 16, at 130–31 (discussing the United States’ suit
against Brazil for its working requirement).
118
See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text (discussing Thailand’s use of compulsory
licensing due to price).
119
See HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE, supra note 16, at 130–31 (observing that commentators are
divided on the issue of whether working requirements violate TRIPS); Jay Taylor, Compulsory
Licensing: A Misused and Abused International Trade Law, PHARM. RSCH. & MFRS. OF AM. (May 16,
2017), https://catalyst.phrma.org/compulsory-licensing-a-misused-and-abused-international-trade-law
(asserting that working requirements violate TRIPS in his role as the Vice President of International
Advocacy at PhRMA).
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frequently cite to a single study by Reed Beall, Randall Kuhn, and Amir
Attaran, which claims that international procurement markets yield better
prices for low-income countries compared to compulsory licensing.120 The
study compared drug prices in similarly situated countries, some of which
used compulsory licensing.121 The researchers considered “the possibility
that compulsory licensing activity in a given calendar year drove down
contemporaneous international procurement prices,” which, when factored,
led to the international procurement price matching the compulsory
licensing price.122
However, the study had a major limitation: the mere threat of
compulsory licensing can impact drug prices,123 as it did for Canada and the
United States with ciprofloxacin. The authors conceded that their study
“does not preclude the possibility that compulsory licenses can be
advantageous under certain circumstances.”124 They further admitted the
possibility that “these licenses have indirectly contributed to lowering
international prices” and noted that “[t]he existence of compulsory licensing
as a legal right likely exerts a generalized downward pressure on global
medicine prices.”125
3. Is Compulsory Licensing Immoral or Unethical?
Some commentators treat patents as a privileged type of property
right126 and characterize the use of compulsory licensing to control drug
prices as theft or stealing. 127 Others maintain that compulsory licensing
disrupts investment-backed expectations, which may reduce foreign
direct investment.128
120

See, e.g., PHRMA SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION, supra note 114, at 23 n.90 (citing Reed F. Beall,
Randall Kuhn & Amir Attaran, Compulsory Licensing Often Did Not Produce Lower Prices for
Antiretrovirals Compared to International Procurement, 34 HEALTH AFFS. 493 (2015)); Christopher
Holt & Will Rinehart, The Folly of Compulsory Licensing, AM. ACTION F. (Aug. 10, 2018),
https://www.americanactionforum.org/weekly-checkup/the-folly-of-compulsory-licensing/ (citing the
same); Wright, supra note 79 (citing the same).
121
Beall, Kuhn & Attaran, supra note 120, at 494–98.
122
Id. at 497.
123
See Gorik Ooms & Johanna Hanefeld, Threat of Compulsory Licenses Could Increase Access to
Essential Medicines, BMJ (May 28, 2019), https://www.bmj.com/content/365/bmj.l2098 (observing that
“compulsory licenses also have power when governments warn patent owners that they will use them
if necessary”).
124
Beall, Kuh & Attaran, supra note 120, at 498.
125
Id. (emphasis added).
126
Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1047, 1057–58
(2009) (discussing how some view patents “as a privileged property right”).
127
See, e.g., Wright, supra note 79; Ronald A. Cass, Patent Remedy, WALL ST . J. (Aug. 28, 2007,
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118824874547610202 (characterizing Thailand’s use of a
compulsory licensing as “effective theft of pharmaceutical companies’ intellectual property”).
128
See Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign Direct
Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 283, 284 (2008) (noting that
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The analogy between patents and traditional property is somewhat
strained.129 Under U.S. law, patent infringement is a tort, and it is not covered
under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.130 Patents are non-rivalrous
goods that lack clear boundaries and provide only the right to exclude—rather
than the right to use—an invention.131 Patents also have at least some attributes
of being a public right,132 and their “boundaries” are heavily shaped by the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office.133 In addition, the U.S. government can
abolish the patent system at any time, which it cannot do for real property
ownership.134 There are, furthermore, no criminal penalties for patent
infringement as there are for tangible property theft.135
Any moral judgments against compulsory licensing must be weighed
against the death and disability resulting from limited drug access. As Margo
Bagley noted, “[m]aking sure the poor have access to the drugs they need in
order to live, in a way that does not harm the patent holder, should be viewed
as part of the social bargain inherent in the patent system and deemed morally
right, not morally wrong.”136 Examining the broader moral perspective,
Bagley suggests that it might be more appropriate to view “the pharmaceutical
companies trying to keep needed drugs from the poor as thieves.”137

compulsory licensing comes at the cost of “disrupt[ing] the investment-backed expectation of the
property right”).
129
See Margo A. Bagley, The Morality of Compulsory Licensing as an Access to Medicines Tool,
102 MINN. L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2018) (questioning the analogy between patents and property).
130
See Golden v. United States, 955 F.3d 981, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (observing that “a cause of
action under the Fifth Amendment is unavailable to patent owners alleging infringement by the
government”) (citing Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1894)).
131
Bagley, supra note 129, at 2465.
132
See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018)
(holding that “[i]nter partes review falls squarely within the public-rights doctrine”).
133
See Bagley, supra note 129, at 2479 (observing that “patent rights are limited property rights at
best” and noting “that their contours and scope are constantly being adjusted through judicial, legislative,
and administrative action”); Sapna Kumar, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Genetic Information, 65 ALA .
L. REV. 625, 638–40 (2014) (noting that “unlike with real property, a government agency is involved in
shaping the scope of the patent right at the outset”).
134
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to create a patent
system, but it does not require Congress to do so. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also Bagley, supra
note 129, at 2479. By contrast, under the Fifth Amendment, the government cannot take property
“without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Note, however, that patent protection is required
under Articles 27 and 28 of TRIPS. TRIPS, supra note 5, arts. 27–28.
135
See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 227 (1985) (noting that, “[d]espite its undoubted
power to do so, . . . Congress has not provided criminal penalties for distribution of goods infringing
valid patents”). See also Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property
Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 488 (2011) (noting that the only criminal provisions relating
to U.S. patents are for forging a patent and falsely marking an invention as being patented).
136
Bagley, supra note 129, at 2480–81 (footnotes omitted).
137
Id. at 2493.
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4. Does Compulsory Licensing Harm Innovation?
The most difficult question to answer is whether compulsory licensing
harms innovation and future drug development.138 Some suggest that the
only way to promote innovation is to have “undiluted” patent rights.139 There
are concerns that utilizing the Bayh-Dole Act’s march-in rights will
“undermine America’s innovation ecosystem” and threaten future drug
development, thereby causing long-term harm.140 Others claim that the
government can rely on pharmaceutical companies to make new treatments
affordable or available to U.S. consumers.141
However, counterarguments can be made. Any gain in innovation must be
weighed against the economic harm caused by an increased mortality and
disability rate during a pandemic.142 There is also a lack of firm empirical
evidence to support the claim that compulsory licensing hurts innovation.143
Furthermore, it is unclear why investors would have strong investment-backed
138
See, e.g., Wright, supra note 79 (claiming that, if the United States utilizes compulsory licensing
to control drug prices, then there would be “fewer miracle drugs being researched and developed”).
139
See, e.g., Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Patent Rights in a Climate of Intellectual Property Rights
Skepticism, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 108–109 (2016) (maintaining that “the collective legal
environment has been hostile to U.S. patent owners” and that “calls for diluted patent rights often go
beyond incremental adjustment and threaten to weaken patents systemically, which could compromise
R&D investment”).
140
See Fred Reinhart, Exercising Bayh-Dole March-In Rights Would Handicap COVID-19
Innovation, STAT (May 4, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/04/bayh-dole-march-in-rightshandicap-covid-19-innovation/ (maintaining that march-in rights would lead to a decrease in investment
in new medicines); see also Joseph Allen, Stand Up to the Anti-Patent COVID-19 Narrative, IP
WATCHDOG (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/04/30/stand-anti-patent-covid-19narrative/id=121197/ (claiming any use of march-in rights for COVID-19 treatments will hinder the
development of new treatments); BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORG., supra note 114, at 9–10 (arguing
pandemic-related compulsory licensing harms innovation).
141
See Reinhart, supra note 140 (noting that “[s]everal firms have already pledged to make
coronavirus treatments widely accessible”); Allen, supra note 140 (quoting the Managing Director for
University Technology Commercialization and Faculty Innovation at Yale University as stating that
“[w]e have academia, industry, government and venture capital all working on a common purpose” and
“that companies like Gilead are pledging to make their drug, Remdesivir, available at cost”).
142
See Maria Polyakova, Geoffrey Kocks, Victoria Udalova & Amy Finkelstein, Initial Economic
Damage from the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States Is More Widespread Across Ages and
Geographies than Initial Mortality Impacts, 117 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 27,934, 27,937 (2020) (finding
“a significant positive relationship between excess all-cause mortality and economic damages across states”
and noting negative spill-over effects). See also David E. Bloom, Daniel Cadarette & JP Sevilla, New and
Resurgent Infectious Diseases Can Have Far-Reaching Economic Repercussions, 55 FIN. & DEV., June
2018, at 46, 46, 49 (discussing how epidemics cause economic harm); WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO GUIDE
TO IDENTIFYING THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DISEASE AND INJURY 2, 27 (2009),
https://www.who.int/choice/publications/d_economic_impact_guide.pdf (discussing the macroeconomic impact
of disease).
143
See Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing
of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 891 (2003) (analyzing data and
concluding that compulsory licenses for drugs “that issue predictably in significant markets” are likely
to impact innovation).

2022]

COMPULSORY LICENSING DURING PANDEMICS

79
144

expectations for drugs that are developed with significant public funding. One
may also argue that any good-will gestures from pharmaceutical companies
during the pandemic are merely calculated attempts to forestall compulsory
licensing, such as Bayer’s “voluntary” price-reduction of ciprofloxacin in 2001.145
It is important to note how uncontroversial compulsory licensing is in
other areas of technology. As noted earlier, the U.S. government regularly
ignores patent rights in an effort to cut costs for defense-related patents.146
Furthermore, it subjects more than five thousand patent applications a year
to secrecy orders under § 181 of the Patent Act.147 Inventors whose
inventions are subject to such an order can only receive damages under § 183
of the Patent Act,148 and they lose the ability to file for patents in other
countries for the order’s duration.149 These heavy restrictions likely impact
innovation in a variety of technological areas, but are tolerated for aiding
national defense. This raises the question of why similar restrictions are not
accepted to promote public health.
III. THE U.S. APPROACH TO DEVELOPING AND OBTAINING
COVID-19 DRUGS
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. government attempted to
secure needed medicines by outspending other countries and by prioritizing
its raw material orders ahead of others. But this did not prevent drug
shortages in the United States. Section A discusses the U.S. government’s
funding contracts with vaccine manufacturers and argues that they were
144
See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 37, at 539–40 (noting that, given that the government has
provided a substantial amount of funding for COVID-19 drugs and vaccines, investors should have
modest expectations with regard to profitability).
145
It is unclear whether AbbVie would have refrained from enforcing its Kaletra patents had Israel
not issued a compulsory license. Likewise, Gilead Science’s move to allow generic companies to
manufacture remdesivir for low- to middle-income countries is arguably motivated by Gilead Science
trying to forestall compulsory licenses from issuing. A similar phenomenon was seen with HIV/AIDS
drugs. See Jennifer Hillman, Drugs and Vaccines Are Coming—But to Whom?, FOREIGN AFFS. (May 19,
2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-05-19/drugs-and-vaccines-are-coming-whom
(discussing how, during the AIDS epidemic, pharmaceutical companies voluntarily adopted better
licensing terms, hoping “to avoid the stigma and financial pain of compulsory licensing”).
146
See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
147
See Erin Duffin, Number of Patent Applications Stifled by U.S. Government Secrecy Orders
2000-2020, STATISTA (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/257098/number-of-patentapplications-stifled-by-us-government-secrecy-orders/ (noting that at the end of the 2020 fiscal year,
5915 patent applications secrecy orders were in effect); Steven Aftergood, Invention Secrecy Hits Recent
High, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (Oct. 31, 2018), https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2018/10/inventionsecrecy-2018 (discussing U.S. Patent & Trademark Office data showing the number of secrecy orders
has been increasing); Steven Aftergood, Invention Secrecy Activity, PROJECT ON GOV’T SECRECY
https://sgp.fas.org/othergov/invention/stats.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2021) (showing an increase of
secrecy orders from the 2017 to 2021 fiscal years).
148
For a discussion of this process, see Scott D. Locke, The Invention Secrecy Act: The USPTO as
a Gatekeeper of National Security, 8 IP THEORY 71, 81–86 (2019).
149
35 U.S.C. § 184(a).
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overly protective of the pharmaceutical companies’ patent rights. Section B
discusses the U.S. shortage of remdesivir in 2020 and explains why
compulsory licensing could have helped alleviate it.
A. Government-Funded Drug Development and Procurement
While high-income countries were pooling resources,150 the Trump
administration embraced “vaccine nationalism”—prioritizing obtaining
vaccines ahead of others.151 Under Operation Warp Speed, it established a
public-private partnership to develop, manufacture, and distribute COVID-19related drugs,152 with $18 billion in funding coming from a variety of sources.153
The Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA)154
and other federal agencies funded vaccine development by seven
manufacturers, including Moderna, Johnson & Johnson (J&J), Sanofi, and
Merck.155 The government also pre-purchased 100 to 300 million vaccine doses
from Moderna, J&J, Sanofi, Pfizer, AstraZeneca, and Novavax.156
There are problems regarding how BARDA’s funding agreements
addressed patent rights. As discussed earlier, when a government agency
150
See Press Release, World Health Org., Global Leaders Unite to Ensure Everyone Everywhere
Can Access New Vaccines, Tests and Treatments for COVID-19 (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/24-04-2020-global-leaders-unite-to-ensure-everyone-everywherecan-access-new-vaccines-tests-and-treatments-for-covid-19.
151
See Rebecca Weintraub, Asaf Bitton & Mark L. Rosenberg, The Danger of Vaccine Nationalism,
HARV. BUS. REV. (May 22, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/05/the-danger-of-vaccine-nationalism (using
“vaccine nationalism” to describe a trend in which, instead of working together, countries take “ a ‘my
nation first’ approach to developing and distributing potential vaccines or other pharmaceutical
treatments”); Nahal Toosi & Natasha Bertrand, Fears Rise That Trump Will Incite a Global Vaccine
Brawl, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/03/coronavirus-vaccine-trump-world-brawl230142 (May 3, 2020, 3:58 PM) (discussing how the United States cut funding to the World Health
Organization and declined to join the EU in pledging funding for COVID-19 vaccines and treatments).
152
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Trump Admin. Announces Framework &
Leadership for ‘Operation Warp Speed’ (May 15, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/05/15/
trump-administration-announces-framework-and-leadership-for-operation-warp-speed.html.
153
The Trump administration shifted $10 billion meant for hospitals and health care workers
and $6 billion that was intended for personal protective equipment, ventilators, and COVID-19
tests. See Rachel Cohrs, The Trump Administration Quietly Spent Billions in Hospital Funds on
Operation Warp Speed, STAT (March 2, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/03/02/trumpadministration-quietly-spent-billions-in-hospital-funds-on-operation-warp-speed (discussing the
$10 billion reallocated from hospitals); U.S. G OV ’T A CCOUNTABILITY O FF., GAO-20-701,
COVID-19: FEDERAL EFFORTS COULD BE STRENGTHENED BY TIMELY AND CONCERTED A CTIONS
135 n.283 (2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-701.pdf (discussing $6 billion that was
reallocated from the U.S. Strategic National Stockpile).
154
BARDA was created within the Department of Health and Human Services in 2006 to prepare
for biological attacks and pandemics. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d(c) (establishing BARDA).
155
Simi V. Siddalingaiah, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IN11560, OPERATION WARP SPEED CONTRACTS
COVID-19 VACCINES AND ANCILLARY VACCINATION MATERIALS 2 (2021),
FOR
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11560. The Biden administration later increased
support for ancillary supplies for vaccine development, including needles, syringes, and vaccine dose
containers. Id.
156
Id.
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provides research funds, it retains a paid-up license under the Bayh-Dole
Act.157 Related regulations state that, absent exceptional circumstances,
“[e]ach funding agreement awarded to a contractor” is supposed to contain a
“standard patent rights clause”158 that requires resulting inventions to be made
“available to the public on reasonable terms.”159 The clause includes the right
for the government to use march-in rights if the funding recipient fails to take
“effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject invention,”160
with “practical application” requiring that the resulting invention be “available
to the public on reasonable terms.”161 It also provides the government with the
right to march-in “to alleviate health or safety needs.”162
Yet, some COVID-19-related BARDA contracts do not conform to
these requirements.163 For example, the government’s contract with J&J
subsidiary Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. narrows the use of march-in rights
to alleviate “urgent health or safety needs” and requires a governmental
declaration of a Public Health Emergency, a significant potential for such an
emergency, or the “declaration by WHO Director General of a public health
emergency of international concern.”164 This would exclude the situation in
which COVID-19 becomes endemic.165
The Pfizer pre-purchase contract grants the company even stronger
protection, likely because Pfizer did not accept vaccine development
funds.166 It states that “all inventions conceived or first actually reduced to
practice” in the performance of the contract “shall be owned by Pfizer” and
157

35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4).
37 C.F.R. § 401.14, .3 (2021).
159
Id. § 401.14(a)(3).
160
Id. § 401.14(j).
161
Id. § 401.14(a), (j).
162
Id. § 401.14(j)(2).
163
See Sydney Lupkin, HHS Released More Coronavirus Vaccine Contracts as Election Results
Unfolded, NPR (Nov. 8, 2020, 2:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/11/08/932793698
/hhs-released-more-coronavirus-vaccine-contracts-as-election-results-unfolded (discussing how some of
the BARDA contracts with drug producers lack march-in rights); Bob Herman, Federal Government
Weakened Its March-In Rights for Coronavirus Drugs, AXIOS (July 1, 2020), https://www.axios.com/
federal-government-barda-contracts-moderna-regeneron-aaf9fde2-2ee1-46fb-8465-0d573e6af1ed.html
(observing how several of the BARDA contracts with drug producers lack the “on reasonable terms”
language required under the Bayh-Dole Act).
164
Amend. of Solicitation/Modification of Cont. Between Janssen Pharms., Inc. & U.S. Army
Contracting Command & Med. Def. CBRN Def. Consortium § IX.8 at 34–35 (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/janssen-corp-covid-vaccine-rapid-ard-to-large-scale-manufacturing.pdf
(emphasis added).
165
See Lupkin, supra note 163 (discussing march-in rights under the Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
and United States Department of Defense agreement).
166
Note that Pfizer’s vaccine partner BioNTech accepted €100 million from the EU’s European
Investment Bank and €375 million from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. Francesco
Guarascio, Exclusive: Europe to Pay Less than U.S. for Pfizer Vaccine Under Initial Deal—Source,
REUTERS (Nov. 11, 2020, 7:03 AM), https://in.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-eu-pfizer/eu-seals
-deal-with-pfizer-biontech-for-supply-of-300-million-doses-of-covid-vaccine-idINKBN27R1F5.
158
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allows Pfizer to decide “whether to hold Subject Inventions as trade
secrets.”167 It furthermore states that the Bayh-Dole Act does not apply and
grants Pfizer ownership over all data generated.168 A Trump-administration
HHS spokesperson claimed that the government was “not entitled to any
rights” because it did not fund the vaccine’s development.169 However, some
scholars argue that guaranteeing $1.95 billion upon the successful invention
of a drug merits stronger rights for the government.170
B. Case Study: The U.S. Remdesivir Shortage of 2020
The 2020 shortage of Gilead Sciences’ remdesivir drug illustrates how
patent rights can contribute to drug scarcity. Remdesivir was originally
investigated as an Ebola treatment,171 and it was later found effective against
some coronaviruses.172 The U.S. government provided $37.5 million in
funding for its development173 and contributed significantly to the
underlying research.174 Indeed, Justin Hughes and Arti Rai argued that “one
167
Letter from the U.S. Army Contracting Command, U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Pfizer, Inc. 17 (July
21, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pfizer-tdl.pdf.
168
Id. The government’s project agreement with Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. for antibodies
similarly states that “the Bayh-Dole statute does not apply.” Project Agreement between Advanced Tech.
Int’l & Regeneron Pharms., Inc. § 7.2(a), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/872589/000180422
020000030/regn-ex102x09302020x10q.htm.
169
Sydney Lupkin, Pfizer’s Coronavirus Vaccine Supply Contract Excludes Many Taxpayer
Protections, NPR (Nov. 24, 2020, 4:46 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/11/24/
938591815/pfizers-coronavirus-vaccine-supply-contract-excludes-many-taxpayer-protections (quoting
Natalie Baldassarre, a spokesperson for the Department of Health and Human Services).
170
See id. (quoting Robin Feldman, a professor at the University of California Hastings College of
the Law, as stating that “[t]he government . . . is giving away the store—meeting critical short-term goals
but ignoring long-term serious costs” and noting that this could lead to unreasonable prices).
171
See generally Travis K. Warren et al., Therapeutic Efficacy of the Small Molecule GS-5734
Against Ebola Virus in Rhesus Monkeys, 531 NATURE 381 (2016) (discussing remdesivir’s efficacy in
treating Ebola in rhesus monkeys).
172
See generally Timothy P. Sheahan et al., Broad-Spectrum Antiviral GS-5734 Inhibits Both
Epidemic and Zoonotic Coronaviruses, 9 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 396 (2017) (discussing how
remdesivir “can inhibit SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV replication in multiple in vitro systems”).
173
See Varoon Mathur, Invoking Bayh-Dole May Be Needed to Get Affordable Covid-19
Treatments, STAT (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/02/invoking-bayh-dole-may-beneeded-to-get-affordable-covid-19-treatments (noting the University of Alabama at Birmingham, which
developed remdesivir, received $37.5 million from the National Institute for Health) (citing Savannah
Koplon, $37.5 Million Grant Will Address Research of High-Priority Infections, UNIV. OF ALA. AT
BIRMINGHAM (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.uab.edu/news/health/item/10307-37-5-million-grant-willaddress-research-of-high-priority-infections).
174
Ed Silverman, The U.S. Government Contributed Research to a Gilead Remdesivir Patent—But
Didn’t Get Credit, STAT (May 8, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/05/08/gileadremdesivir-covid19-coronavirus-patents. Indeed, in February 2020, the FDA issued Remdesivir orphan
drug status—a move that would provide Gilead with an additional seven-year exclusivity. Jonathan
Gardner, In Rare Move, Gilead Gives Up ‘Orphan’ Status for Experimental Coronavirus Drug,
BIOPHARMA DIVE (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/coronavirus-gilead-remdesivir
-orphan-drug/574882. The public backlash was so severe that Gilead asked the FDA to rescind this
status. Id.
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or more government researchers should probably have been listed as
inventors on key patents for remdesivir.”175
On January 31, 2020, HHS Secretary Azar declared a public health
emergency due to COVID-19.176 This enabled the FDA to issue an
Emergency Use Authorization on May 1 for remdesivir, which was not
FDA-approved at the time.177 The decision was based on a clinical trial that
showed remdesivir shortened the recovery time for sick patients.178
Remdesivir shortages in the United States and elsewhere quickly arose.
Gilead Sciences blamed the shortage on a “resource- and time-intensive”
production process with sequential and specialized steps that required “novel
substances with limited global availability.”179 It maintained that production
required “sterile drug product manufacturing capabilities,” which limited the
number of capable manufacturers.180 It further claimed that the complex
manufacturing process hindered scaling up production.181 Gilead Sciences
did utilize some out-licensing by granting a royalty-free license to five
generic manufacturers in other countries,182 which was later expanded to
other manufacturers.183 However, it waited until mid-May to do so, and it
excluded the United States and most other highly-developed countries from
buying drugs produced under license.184
175
Justin Hughes & Arti K. Rai, Acknowledging the Public Role in Private Drug Development:
Lessons from Remdesivir, STAT (May 8, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/08/acknowledgingpublic-role-drug-development-lessons-remdesivir.
176
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Sec’y Azar Declares Pub. Health
Emergency for U.S. for 2019 Novel Coronavirus (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2
020/01/31/secretary-azar-declares-public-health-emergency-us-2019-novel-coronavirus.html. See also
Determination of Pub. Health Emergency, 85 Fed. Reg. 7,316 (Feb. 7, 2020) (issuing notice of a public
health emergency pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, effective February 4, 2020).
177
Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Admin. to Ashley Rhoades, Manager, Regul. Affs., Gilead Scis.,
Inc. (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/137564/download. Full FDA approval was granted on
October 22, 2020. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves First Treatment for COVID19 (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-treatment
-covid-19.
178
Adam Feuerstein & Matthew Herper, FDA to Allow Emergency Use of Gilead’s COVID-19
Drug, STAT (May 1, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/01/fda-to-allow-emergency-use-ofgileads-covid-19-drug.
179
Working to Supply Veklury® for COVID-19, G ILEAD , https://www.gilead.com/purpose/
advancing-global-health/covid-19/working-to-supply-remdesivir-for-covid-19 (Oct. 22, 2020).
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Valerie Bauman, Gilead Gives Royalty-Free Remdesivir Licenses to Five Drugmakers (1),
BLOOMBERG L., https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-life-sciences/gilead-gives-royalty-freeremdesivir-licenses-to-five-drugmakers (May 12, 2020, 5:12 PM) (discussing a royalty-free license
granted to five Indian and Pakistani drug manufacturers).
183
Voluntary Licensing Agreements for Remdesivir, G ILEAD , https://www.gilead.com/purpose
/advancing-global-health/covid-19/voluntary-licensing-agreements-for-remdesivir (last visited July
31, 2021).
184
See Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Gilead Strikes Deal to Make Remdesivir Coronavirus Treatment for
127 Countries, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/12/remdesivir-coronavirus-treatment-gilead-strikes
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During this time, Bangladesh-based companies began working on replicating
remdesivir. Bangladesh is classified as a WTO Least-Developed Country, meaning
that it is not required to offer patents on pharmaceutical products.185 In May 2020,
Bangladeshi company Beximco achieved the seemingly impossible: it
independently recreated remdesivir186 and began selling it187 one month before any
Gilead Sciences-authorized partners began production.188 In contrast to the $3,120
per treatment cost that the United States paid,189 Beximco’s drug cost only $336 per
treatment.190 Other Bangladeshi companies soon began producing the generic,
leading to a growing surplus that allowed Bangladesh to export fifty-thousand vials
to six other countries by late July191 and to twenty-one countries by late August.192
-deal-to-make-drug-in-127-countries.html (May 13, 2020, 9:28 AM) (discussing Gilead’s license with
Mylan, Cipla, Ferozsons Laboratories, Hetero Labs, and Jubilant Lifesciences).
185
See WTO Drugs Patent Waiver for LDCs Extended Until 2033, UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/ldcportal/wto-drugs-patent-waiver-for-ldcs-extended-until-2033 (last visited July
31, 2021) (discussing that the waiver “exempts LDCs from obligations under the TRIPS agreement
related to patents or other intellectual property rights on pharmaceutical products and clinical data”);
Least-Developed Countries, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif
_e/org7_e.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2021) (listing Bangladesh as an LDC).
186
See A.Z.M. Anas, Bangladesh’s Beximco Thrives on Coronavirus Challenges, NIKKEI ASIA
(July 26, 2020, 2:36 AM), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Pharmaceuticals/Bangladesh-s-Beximcothrives-on-coronavirus-challenges (noting Beximco and other Bangladeshi drug manufacturers had no
license from Gilead and relied on Bangladesh’s Least-Developed Country status); Christopher Garrison,
Price, Profit and the Covid-19 Health Technology Pool: The Example of Remdesivir, MEDS. L. & POL’Y
(May 28, 2020), https://medicineslawandpolicy.org/2020/05/price-profit-and-the-covid-19-health-technology
-pool-the-example-of-remdesivir (noting Beximco’s generic of remdesivir was independently developed).
187
Beximco Pharma Launches First Generic Remdesivir for Covid-19, PHARM. TECH.,
https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/news/beximco-pharmaceuticals-remdesivir-generic (Sept.
7, 2020, 10:10 AM).
188
See Cheena Kapoor, India Starts Producing Generic Remdesivir amid Pandemic, ANADOLU
AGENCY (June 22, 2020), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/india-starts-producing-generic-remdesivir
-amid-pandemic/1885845 (noting Cipla and Hetero Pharma began production on June 21, 2020); Sohini
Das, Pharma Firms Commit 815,000 Doses of Remdesivir Supply in August, BUS.
STANDARD, https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/pharma-firms-commit-815-000-dosesof-remdesivir-supply-in-august-120073000477_1.html (July 30, 2020, 11:07 AM) (noting that only
Hetero, Mylan, and Cipla had launched their generics by July 30, 2020); Kaleem Naqvi, CEO Ferozsons
Highlights Agreement Details with Gilead for Manufacturing of Covid-19 Treatment Drug,
Remdesivir, in Pakistan, TECH . TIMES (July 10, 2020), https://www.technologytimes.pk/2020/07/10/
ceo-ferozsons-highlights-agreement-details-with-gilead-for-manufacturing-of-covid-19-treatment-drug
-remdesivir-in-pakistan (noting Ferozsons gained manufacturing permission from the Drug Regulatory
Authority of Pakistan (“DRAP”) on June 22, 2020).
189
Matthew Herper, Gilead Announces Long-Awaited Price for Covid-19 Drug Remdesivir, STAT
(June 29, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/06/29/gilead-announces-remdesivir-price-covid-19
(discussing remdesivir pricing).
190
See Anas, supra note 186 (discussing Beximco’s development of a remdesivir generic and its
supply agreements with other countries).
191
Sajjadur Rahman, Remdesivir Saved the Day for Pharma Industry, BUS. STANDARD,
https://tbsnews.net/companies/pharma/bangladesh-made-remdesivir-high-export-demand-112387 (July
28, 2020, 11:13 AM).
192
Jagaran Chakma, Remdesivir Can Rake in Tk 700cr, DAILY STAR, https://www.thedailystar.net
/business/news/remdesivir-can-rake-tk-700cr-1950581 (Aug. 25, 2020, 2:01 AM).
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Beginning in May 2020, the U.S. government was forced to ration
remdesivir,193 as states began reporting shortages.194 In late June, HHS
Secretary Azar bragged that President Trump “struck an amazing deal to
ensure Americans have access” to remdesivir and claimed that, “[t]o the
extent possible, we want to ensure that any American patient who needs
remdesivir can get it.”195 However, shortages in the United States persisted.
By mid-July, Texas, Florida, and Arizona were all experiencing remdesivir
shortages, and doctors were forced to ration it.196 Given that several states
experienced widespread hospital bed shortages during this time,197 the
shortage likely led to additional patient deaths, either from COVID-19 or
from other conditions requiring timely emergency care.
Admittedly, remdesivir shortages were likely exacerbated by the
government’s failure to fairly distribute its supply.198 Doctors criticized the
lack of transparency in the distribution process, which led to lower-priority
hospitals gaining access to drugs before areas in crisis.199 But
notwithstanding the fact that some states had greater access to remdesivir
than others, these problems were ultimately a result of the inadequate supply
from Gilead Sciences.200 During this time period, such a shortage did not
193
See Joseph Walker, All Remdesivir Supplies to Be Distributed in U.S. by Maker Gilead Sciences,
WALL ST . J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/all-remdesivir-supplies-to-be-distributed-in-u-s-by-makergilead-sciences-11601575201 (Oct. 1, 2020, 4:13 PM) (noting how, as of October 2020, remdesivir had
been in short supply since it became authorized for emergency use, with the shortage dissipating only in
late September 2020).
194
Boodman & Ross, supra note 1 (discussing the remdesivir shortage in various states including
Massachusetts and California in May 2020).
195
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Trump Admin. Secures New Supplies
of Remdesivir for the U.S. (June 29, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/06/29/trump-administration
-secures-new-supplies-remdesivir-united-states.html.
196
See Elizabeth Cohen, Covid-19 Drug Rationed in the US is Plentiful in Developing Countries,
CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/09/health/covid-remdesivir-us-vs-other-countries/index.html (Sept.
9, 2020, 9:17 AM) (discussing how doctors in Texas were forced to choose which patients would receive
remdesivir); Eric Boodman, From Houston to Miami, Hospitals Running Short of Remdesivir for Covid19 Patients, STAT (July 10, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/07/10/hospitals-running-short-ofremdesivir-for-covid19-patients (discussing remdesivir shortages in Texas, Florida, and Arizona in July 2020).
197
See Edgar Walters, Shannon Najmabadi & Emma Platoff, Texas Hospitals Are Running Out of
Drugs, Beds, Ventilators and Even Staff, TEX. TRIB. (July 14, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org
/2020/07/14/texas-hospitals-coronavirus; Eliza Barclay & Dylan Scott, Hospitals Are Running Out of Staff,
Supplies, and Beds for Covid-19 Patients — And This Time Could Be Worse, VOX, https://www.vox.com
/2020/7/15/21317776/covid-19-coronavirus-florida-arizona-texas-california-hospitals (July 16, 2020, 9:19 AM).
198
See Boodman & Ross, supra note 1 (noting widespread criticism of the government’s “uneven
and opaque” remdesivir distribution system).
199
Id.
200
See Christopher Morten, Christian Urrutia & James Krellenstein, A Powerful Law Gives HHS
the Right to Take Control of Remdesivir Manufacturing and Distribution, STAT (July 2, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/2020/07/02/powerful-law-gives-hhs-right-to-control-remdesivirmanufacturing-distribution (noting that, because Gilead failed to meet demand, the U.S. medical system
experienced “severe shortages” of remdesivir); Walker, supra note 193 (noting, in October 2020, that
remdesivir had been in short supply since it became authorized for emergency use).
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exist in countries that had access to generics, including Bangladesh,
Pakistan, and the Philippines.201
Beximco’s ability to reverse-engineer and produce remdesivir shows
that the United States could have also produced it. Indeed, researchers and
private companies in Taiwan were also able to independently replicate
remdesivir in a short period of time.202 Consequently, the six-month U.S.
shortage was exacerbated by Gilead Sciences’ refusal to license its patents
more broadly.203
Other countries dealing with COVID-19 outbreaks have chosen to use
compulsory licensing for remdesivir, including India and Russia. In the
spring of 2021, India faced a shortage, notwithstanding having Gilead
Sciences-licensed domestic producers.204 Although India did not go through
the formal compulsory licensing process, it accepted ten thousand doses of
Beximco-produced remdesivir.205 In May 2021, Russia’s Supreme Court
rejected a lawsuit from Gilead Sciences and affirmed the Russian
government’s decision to issue a compulsory license to Russian drug
manufacturer Pharmasyntez for remdesivir.206
IV. HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES FACILITATING COMPULSORY
LICENSING DURING THE PANDEMIC
During the pandemic, several high-income countries have shifted their
views regarding compulsory licensing. Canada and several EU member
states amended their laws to make compulsory licensing easier for the
duration of the public health emergency, and both Israel and Hungary issued
pandemic-related compulsory licenses for drugs. At least some of this shift
was driven by the United States out-spending other countries on vaccines
early in the pandemic.
Section A examines Canada’s pandemic-related compulsory licensing
legislation. Section B discusses Israel’s issuance of a compulsory license for
201

See Cohen, supra note 196 (noting how several developing countries had adequate supplies of
remdesivir while the United States experienced shortages).
202
Ping-Hsun Chen, Taiwan’s Efforts to Recreate Remdesivir, 40 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 174,
177–80 (2021).
203
See Amy Kapczynski, Paul Biddinger & Rochelle Walensky, Remdesivir Could Be in Short Supply.
Here’s a Fix., N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/opinion/remdesivirshortage-coronavirus.html (calling for compulsory licensing of remdesivir); Morten & Duan, supra note
44, at 74–75 (noting that the remdesivir shortage is the result of patent rights).
204
See Kallol Bhattacherjee, Coronavirus: Bangladesh Gifts India 10,000 Remdesivir Vials,
HINDU, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/coronavirus-bangladesh-gifts-india-10000-remdesivir
-vials/article34499574.ece (May 6, 2021) (discussing Bangladesh’s donation of remdesivir to India).
205
Id.
206
Alexander Marrow, Russian Court Rejects U.S. Firm’s Lawsuit over COVID-19 Drug
Remdesivir, REUTERS (May 28, 2021, 6:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcarepharmaceuticals/russian-supreme-court-rejects-gilead-lawsuit-over-covid-19-drug-2021-05-27.
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the first time in its history. Section C focuses on actions taken by the EU and
its member states.
A. Canada
Canada has historically been a strong proponent of compulsory
licensing.207 Prior to the passage of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, Canada freely issued compulsory licenses to increase patient
access to drugs.208 Canada’s Patent Act formerly permitted generic drug
manufacturers to stockpile generic drugs prior to the relevant patent’s
expiration, and it only changed the law after a WTO panel held that it
violated TRIPS.209
Prior to the pandemic, Canada’s Patent Act already permitted the
government to use patents during national emergencies and for public
non-commercial use.210 But what constitutes a national emergency is
somewhat narrow under the Emergencies Act of 1985:
[A] national emergency is an urgent and critical situation of a
temporary nature that . . . seriously endangers the lives, health
or safety of Canadians and is of such proportions or nature as
to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal with
it . . . and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other
law of Canada.211
The governmental power to use patents can only be invoked once a public
health emergency becomes large enough to exceed provincial governments’
ability to control it, which is far less effective than if the federal government
could act immediately.212 This is the result of Canada’s constitutional division
of powers, under which health is not assigned to either provincial or federal
governments, forcing both to share responsibilities.213
207
None of the top twenty pharmaceutical companies by revenue are headquartered in Canada. Eric
Sagonowsky, The Top 20 Pharma Companies by 2019 Revenue, FIERCE PHARMA (Apr. 20, 2020, 3:00
AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/special-report/top-20-pharma-companies-by-2019-revenue.
208
HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE, supra note 16, at 153.
209
See Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS114/13, ¶ 20 (arbitration award circulated Aug. 18, 2000) (holding that § 55.2(2) of Canada’s
Patent Act violates TRIPS Article 28.1 and was not covered by the exception under Article 30).
210
Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c P-4, ss 19, 19.1 (Can.). The North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”) prohibited Canada’s widespread use of compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals. North
American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 670–81.
211
Emergencies Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 22 (4th Supp.), s 3 (Can.).
212
Amy Swiffen, The Limits of Canada’s Federal Emergency Law During the Coronavirus
Pandemic, CONVERSATION (Apr. 1, 2020, 10:27 AM), https://theconversation.com/the-limits-ofcanadas-federal-emergency-law-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic-134309 (noting the limited utility of
the Emergencies Act, given that the Canadian government can respond “only after the spread has
exceeded the response capacities of the provinces”).
213
Id.
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In 2004, Canada amended its laws to create Canada’s Access to
Medicines Regime (CAMR), which authorizes generic manufacturers to
export fifty-seven drugs and vaccines to poor countries, primarily for the
treatment of HIV/AIDS.214 Canadian pharmaceutical company Apotex
entered into an agreement with Médecins San Frontières to test the law by
manufacturing a fixed-dose combination of three existing HIV/AIDS drugs,
later known as TriAvir.215 In July 2007, Rwanda became the first country to
notify the WTO of its intent to import drugs manufactured under compulsory
license,216 and in October, Canada became the first country to authorize the
manufacture and export of a generic drug produced under compulsory
license.217 However, CAMR’s narrow list of covered drugs and bureaucratic
hurdles make it difficult to use.218
Under Canada’s COVID-19 Emergency Response Act, the Minister of
Health gained temporary authority to issue compulsory licenses, even if the
patent holder could produce the patented invention.219 The government was
not obligated to negotiate with the patent holder before granting a
compulsory license. It merely required that the government “pay the
patentee any amount that the Commissioner [of Patents] considers to be
adequate remuneration in the circumstances, taking into account the
economic value of the authorization and the extent to which they make,
construct, use and sell the patented invention.”220 The provision further
clarified that producing drugs under compulsory licensing “in relation to a
public health emergency . . . is not an infringement of the patent.”221
Although the emergency patent provision expired on September 30, 2020,222
it provides a template for future health emergencies.
B. Israel
In 2020, Israel issued a COVID-19-related compulsory license. Israel
was unable to obtain a sufficient supply of AbbVie’s Kaletra,223 which held
214
See Reichman, supra note 27, at 255 (noting that the Canadian legislation was limited to only
fifty-seven drugs or vaccines, primarily for treating AIDS).
215
Holger P. Hestermeyer, Canadian-Made Drugs for Rwanda: The First Application of the WTO
Waiver on Patents and Medicines, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L.: INSIGHTS (Dec. 10, 2007),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/11/issue/28/canadian-made-drugs-rwanda-first-application-wto
-waiver-patents-and.
216
Canada Is First to Notify Compulsory License to Export Generic Drug, WORLD TRADE ORG.
(Oct. 4, 2007), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news07_e/trips_health_notif_oct07_e.htm.
217
Hestermeyer, supra note 215.
218
Reichman, supra note 27, at 255.
219
COVID-19 Emergency Response Act, S.C. 2020, c 5, s 51 (Can.).
220
Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c P-4, s 19.4(5) (Can.).
221
Id. s 19.4(7).
222
COVID-19 Emergency Response Act, S.C. 2020, c 5, ss 10–11 (Can.).
223
Tal Band, Unusual Times, Unusual Measures: The Israeli Ministry of Health Permits the
Exploitation of Abbvie’s Patents Covering KALETRA® to Allow Importation of Generic Version,
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promise as a treatment. Section 104 of Israel’s Patents Law allows the
government to issue compulsory licenses if the Minister “finds that that is
necessary in the interests of the National security or of the maintenance of
essential supplies and services.”224 Using these provisions for the first time,
the Minister of Health authorized a license to a third-party producer.225
Shortly thereafter, AbbVie announced that it would not enforce its patent
rights on Kaletra.226 It is likely that AbbVie feared that more countries
would follow Israel’s lead and issue their own licenses, setting precedent
that could promote more widespread use of compulsory licensing during
future health emergencies. 227
C. European Union
The EU and its member states are more comfortable than the United
States with using compulsory licensing for drugs.228 Under Regulation (EC)
No 816/2006, the EU ratified the WTO’s decision regarding the export of
medicines to countries that lack sufficient manufacturing capacity.229
Member states are required to grant a compulsory license to anyone making
a valid request to manufacture drugs for export.230 Beyond this circumstance,
LEXOLOGY (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=12272bd5-c581-4c21a1af-f253595d23e4.
224
§ 104, Patents Law, 5727-1967 (Isr.), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/il/il040en.pdf.
225
Band, supra note 223.
226
Phil Taylor, AbbVie Won’t Enforce Patents for COVID-19 Drug Candidate Kaletra,
PHARMAPHORUM (Mar. 25, 2020), https://pharmaphorum.com/news/abbvie-wont-enforce-patents-forcovid-19-drug-candidate-kaletra/.
227
See Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in
International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 226 (2005)
(maintaining that voluntary royalty-free licenses should be viewed in the context of compulsory licensing
laws, given “such licenses can be seen as responses to the looming threat of compulsory licensing”).
228
This higher comfort level may be because EU member states already regulate drug prices and
permit EU-wide parallel importation. See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 37, at 556–57 (noting that no
significant difference exists between mandating drug prices and threatening compulsory licensing if a
drug is priced too high); Joined Cases C-267/95 & C-268/95, Merck & Co. v. Primecrown Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:1996:468, ¶ 54 (Dec. 5, 1996) (reaffirming the right of EU member states to import patented
drugs from other member states).
229
Regulation (EC) 816/2006, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on
Compulsory Licensing of Patents Relating to the Manufacture of Pharmaceutical Products for Export to
Countries with Public Health Problems, 2006 O.J. (L 157) (“This Regulation establishes a procedure for
the grant of compulsory licences in relation to patents and supplementary protection certificates
concerning the manufacture and sale of pharmaceutical products, when such products are intended for
export to eligible importing countries in need of such products in order to address public health
problems.”); see also Reichman, supra note 27, at 256 (noting that the EU’s regulation “appears to
successfully incorporate most of the flexibilities available to WTO Members”).
230
Regulation (EC) 816/2006, supra note 229, art. 1; see also Nafsika Karavida, Dara Onofrio &
Deena Merlen, Patent Rights and Wrongs in the COVID-19 Pandemic: EU and U.S. Approaches to
Compulsory Licensing, IP WATCHDOG (May 19, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/05/19/patent
-rights-wrongs-covid-19-pandemic-eu-u-s-approaches-compulsory-licensing/id=121709/ (noting that “EU
law provides that every EU Member State shall grant a compulsory license for the manufacturing and
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legislation regarding compulsory licensing is primarily handled at the
national level.231 Notwithstanding the fact that the EU is home to several
major pharmaceutical companies, various member states have made changes
to their laws to facilitate compulsory licensing, and the EU has moved
towards streamlining its use.
1.

France

Prior to the pandemic, France already had compulsory licensing
legislation. In the early 2000s, France amended its patent law to allow the
broader use of ex officio licenses, which permit the government to license
medicines, medical devices, and tests to third-party manufacturers “[w]here
the interests of public health demand, and in the absence of a voluntary
agreement with the patent holder.”232 This provision can be utilized if an
“insufficient quantity or quality” of patented products exists or if they are
sold “at abnormally high prices.”233
In March 2020, France declared a COVID-19-related state of health
emergency234 and passed Emergency Law n° 2020-290, which added Article
L.3131-15 to the Code of Public Health.235 The law states that, for the
duration of France’s health emergency, the Prime Minister may temporarily
control the prices of products and services related to COVID-19 and take
measures to ensure the availability of medicines to treat it.236 These measures
must be “strictly proportionate to the health risks at stake and appropriate to
distribution of medicine to least-developed and developing countries, so long as the conditions in TRIPS
(Article 31) on compulsory licensing are fulfilled”).
231
Michael Mezher, European Commission Says Compulsory Licensing Can Only Happen at
National Level, REGUL. FOCUS (June 26, 2015), https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus%E2%84%A2/
news-articles/2015/6/european-commission-says-compulsory-licensing-can-only-happen-at-national-level.
232
LOVE, supra note 99.
233
Code de la propriété intellectuelle [Intellectual Property Code] art. L613-16 (Fr.); see also Esther
van Zimmeren & Gilles Requena, Ex-Officio Licensing in the Medical Sector: The French Model, in
GENE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 123, 125 (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2007) (providing a detailed
analysis of French compulsory licensing).
234
Stéphanie Dagron, COVID-19 in France: Health as a Constitutional Value and Limitations on
Civil Liberties, BILL OF HEALTH (May 28, 2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/28/
france-global-responses-covid19/ (citing French law permitting the government to declare a state of
health emergency).
235
Francois Pochart, Mathilde Rauline, Océane de La Verteville & August Debouzy, Compulsory
Licenses Granted by Public Authorities: An Application in the Covid-19 Crisis in France? Part 1,
WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER PAT. BLOG (Apr. 23, 2020), http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2020/04/2
3/compulsory-licenses-granted-by-public-authorities-an-application-in-the-covid-19-crisis-in-france-part-1
[hereinafter Pochart, Part 1]. The law was extended, and it is now set to expire on December 31, 2021.
Francine Le Péchon-Joubert & Carlyne Sevestre, Covid-19 Vaccines: Intellectual Property Issues,
Including Sharing of Patents, Licensing and Government Rights to Compulsory Licensing – The French
Perspective, INT’L BAR ASS’N (May 25, 2021), https://www.ibanet.org/covid-19-vaccines-intellectualproperty-issues-French-perspective#_ednref6 (discussing a February 2021 law that extended the state of
health emergency).
236
Pochart, Part 1, supra note 235.
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the circumstances of the time and place” and end when they are no longer
necessary. 237 During a discussion at the French Parliament, the Minister of
Health stated that he would consider using compulsory licensing or price
controls on drugs that were not produced in France.238 France has also joined
the United States in supporting a TRIPS waiver for COVID-19 vaccines.239
There are limitations, however, under the French provisions. For
example, French Senator Ronan Le Gleut introduced a bill to extend the ex
officio license to encompass inventions that do not yet have issued patents,
as well as to permit licensing in situations in which a future drug shortage is
merely probable.240 Furthermore, he observed that French law currently does
not address circumventing data and marketing exclusivities for drugs,241 a
problem that exists under U.S. law as well.242
2. Germany
Germany is the world’s fourth-largest pharmaceutical market and has
several major pharmaceutical companies.243 Its views on compulsory
licensing have evolved significantly over the past few years. The German
Patent Act permits compulsory licensing when it is in the interest of public
welfare or a matter of national security, although the government must pay
“equitable remuneration” to the patent holder.244 Under section 24(1), a third
party seeking a license must show that negotiations with the patent holder
failed and that a license is in the public interest.245 The court will not award

237
Code de la santé publique [Public Health Code] art. L3131-15 (Fr.); see Pochart, Part 1, supra
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Francois Pochart, Mathilde Rauline, Océane de La Verteville & August Debouzy, Compulsory
Licenses Granted by Public Authorities: An Application in the Covid-19 Crisis in France? Part 2,
WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER PAT. BLOG (Apr. 24, 2020), http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2020/04/
24/compulsory-licenses-granted-by-public-authorities-an-application-in-the-covid-19-crisis-in-francepart-2/ [hereinafter Pochart, Part 2].
239
Ashleigh Furlong, Macron Backs Waiving COVID-19 Vaccine Patents Ahead of G7 Summit,
POLITICO (June 10, 2021, 12:04 AM), https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-backs-waiving-covid-19vaccine-patents-ahead-of-g7-summit/.
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Matthieu Dhenne, French Bill Proposal Authorizing the Granting of an Ex Officio License in the
Interest of Public Health in the Event of an Extreme Health Emergency, WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER
PAT. BLOG (Apr. 28, 2021), http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/04/28/french-bill-proposal-authorizing
-the-granting-of-an-ex-officio-license-in-the-interest-of-public-health-in-the-event-of-an-extreme-healthemergency/.
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Id.
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See supra Part IV.A.
243
See GER. TRADE & I NV ., THE PHARMACEUTICAL I NDUSTRY IN G ERMANY 3 (2021/2022)
(discussing the scope of the pharmaceutical market in Germany).
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Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BGBL I at 1, as amended by Act of Oct. 8,
2017, BGBL I at 3546, § 13 (Ger.).
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Id. § 24(1).
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a compulsory license if another product can substitute for it, and a drug to
treat a serious illness must have some “specific therapeutic characteristics”
that other drugs lack.247
In the 2017 case Merck Sharp & Dohme Ltd. v. Shinogi & Co., the
German Federal Court of Justice (FCJ) affirmed, for the first time, the Federal
Patent Court’s (FPC) award of a section 24(1) license.248 Merck Sharp &
Dohme Ltd. (Merck) produced an HIV antiretroviral drug containing
raltegravir. Although Shionogi & Co. (Shionogi) held the raltegravir patent, it
neither practiced it nor licensed it to anyone, including Merck.249 After a year
of fruitless negotiations, Shionogi sued Merck for patent infringement.250 The
FPC granted Merck a compulsory license, and the FCJ affirmed, observing
that although few patients were using Merck’s drug, there was a risk of
adverse health effects if they switched to a different one.251
In response to the COVID-19 outbreak, Germany passed the Prevention
and Control of Infectious Diseases in Humans Act.252 This provided the
Federal Ministry of Health with a range of extra powers in the event of a
parliament-declared national epidemic,253 including the ability to compel
pharmaceutical companies to make patented vaccines and medicines available
to the public in exchange for fair compensation.254 The new legislation was
intended to remedy the slow pace of section 24 proceedings.255
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Christof Hohne, Compulsory Licenses in Germany: A Tool for Licensing Negotiations?, EUR.
PHARM. REV. (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.europeanpharmaceuticalreview.com/article/84768/compulsory
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30 (2018), http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponot.nsf/0/8509F913B768D063C1258382004F
C677/$File/compulsory_licensing_in_europe_en.pdf.
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BGH, July 11, 2017, X ZB 2/17 17, juris (Ger.) http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/
rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&Datum=2017-7-11&nr=79269&pos=22&anz=24.
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Hohne, supra note 246.
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EUR. PAT. OFF., supra note 247, at 31. Note that the patent at issue was eventually cancelled,
but a royalty was paid until the cancellation. Thomas Hirse, Compulsory Licensing in Germany, CMS
(Feb. 15, 2021), https://cms.law/en/int/expert-guides/cms-expert-guide-to-compulsory-licensing/germany.
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Adam Houldsworth, The Key COVID-19 Compulsory Licensing Developments So Far, IAM
(Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/coronavirus/the-key-covid-19-compulsory-licensingdevelopments-so-far. Although this legislation was originally set to last until March 31, 2021, the
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Diseases in Humans], July 20, 2000, BGBL I at 1045, as amended by Act of Sept. 27, 2021, BGBL I at
4530, §§ 4, 5 (Ger.) (authorizing the Federal Ministry of Health, in accordance with section 13.1 of the
Patent Act, to license patented inventions to ensure an adequate supply of pharmaceuticals).
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3. Hungary
In 2020, Hungary issued Government Decree No. 212/2020, permitting
the Hungarian Intellectual Property Office to issue a public health
compulsory license for patented medicines, procedures, and medical
devices.256 The Hungarian government then approached local drug
manufacturer Richter to manufacture remdesivir.257 By October 2020,
Richter was able to produce enough remdesivir to treat 3,000 patients and
began clinical trials.258 BIO and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce both
opposed this measure, maintaining that the EU Joint Procurement
Agreement provided Hungary with an adequate supply.259
4. The EU’s Response to U.S. Government Actions
Both the Trump and Biden administrations have pushed the EU towards
broader acceptance of compulsory licensing, though in different ways. The
Trump administration attempted to outspend the EU for priority access to
COVID-19 vaccines, creating significant backlash, while the Biden
administration backed a patent-related waiver to TRIPS that forced the EU
to offer its own counterproposal to the WTO.
a. The Trump Administration
The Trump administration attempted to buy priority access to German and
French companies’ vaccines. In March 2020, President Trump met with the
chief executive of Germany-based CureVac and offered him a “large sum” of
money for exclusive access to a vaccine that CureVac was developing.260 The
German newspaper Die Welt am Sonntag reported that President Trump
offered CureVac $1 billion and that he wanted the vaccine to be available
“only for the United States.”261 German Health Minister Jens Spahn
256
212/2020. (V. 16.) Korm. r. a Belföldi Hasznosításra Szolgáló Közegészségügyi Kényszerengedélyről
(Governmental Decree No. 212/2020 (V. 16.) on Public Health Compulsory Licenses for Exploitation
Within Hungary) (Hung.).
257
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258
See id. (noting that Richter had manufactured enough remdesivir to treat 3,000 patients);
Romhanyikatalin, Hungarian Remdesivir Is Already in Use at Three Clinics of Semmelweis University,
SEMMELWEIS UNIV. (Oct. 19, 2020), https://semmelweis.hu/english/2020/10/the-hungarian-remdesivir-is-alre
ady-in-practice-at-three-clinics-of-semmelweis-university/ (discussing clinical trials of Richter’s remdesivir).
259
PHRMA SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION, supra note 114, at 250; BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION
ORG., supra note 114, at 9-10; U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., 2021 SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 17 (2021),
https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/USCC_2021_Special_301_Filing.pdf.
260
Katrin Bennhold & David E. Sanger, U.S. Offered ‘Large Sum’ to German Company for Access
to Coronavirus Vaccine Research, German Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
03/15/world/europe/cornonavirus-vaccine-us-germany.html (June 16, 2021).
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subsequently assured Germans that the deal was “off the table,” and he
promised that any developed vaccine would be “for the entire world.”262
Economy Minister Peter Altmaier stated more succinctly that “Germany is not
for sale.”263 The German government subsequently bought a twenty-three
percent equity stake in CureVac.264
In May 2020, Sanofi Chief Executive Officer Paul Hudson claimed that
the United States would have “the right to the largest pre-order” for any
developed vaccine because BARDA “invested in taking the risk” by
providing $600 million in funding.265 The French government was outraged,
noting that it provides Sanofi with major tax exemptions.266 Sanofi
subsequently backed away from its initial position.267
President Trump’s actions pushed the EU towards embracing
compulsory licensing. In 2020, for the first time, more conservative
members of the European Parliament voiced support for compulsory
licensing.268 Peter Liese—a German Christian Democratic Union member
of European Parliament and spokesperson for the center-right European
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Owen Dyer, Covid-19: Trump Sought to Buy Vaccine Developer Exclusively for US, Say
German Officials, BMJ (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.bmj.com/content/368/bmj.m1100 (quoting Jens
Spahn).
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/15/bundesregierung-beteiligt-sich-mit-300-millionen-euro-an-curevac/.
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Succeeds, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-13/u-s-to-get-sanofi-covidvaccine-first-if-it-succeeds-ceo-says (May 13, 2020, 4:34 PM) (quoting Paul Hudson); Eleanor
Beardsley, French Drug Giant Sanofi Takes Heat After Suggesting U.S. May Get 1st Vaccine Access,
NPR (May 15, 2020, 2:10 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/15/856293764/french-drug-giant-sanofitakes-heat-after-suggesting-u-s-may-get-1st-vaccine-acc (noting that, according to President of the
Sanofi board Serge Weinberg, the U.S. government has contributed $600 million towards Sanofi’s
research); Dina Spencer, COVID-19 Vaccine: Sanofi CEO Paul Hudson Commits to “Bring a Solution to
Everybody, Everywhere”, PHARMA BOARDROOM (May 28, 2020), https://pharmaboardroom.com/articles/
sanofi-ceo-paul-hudson-commits-to-bring-a-solution-to-everybody-everywhere/ (discussing Sanofi’s financial
relationship with BARDA).
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People’s Party (EPP) —threatened to use compulsory licensing if
President Trump hoarded drugs or vaccines.270 Liese noted that although
Europe supports a collaborative approach, “plan B” is to use compulsory
licensing.271 He furthermore expressed support for licensing remdesivir.272
This shift in position is noteworthy, given that the EPP has been “a staunch
defender of the interests of the pharmaceutical industry.”273
In November 2020, the European Commission formally embraced
compulsory licensing in its Intellectual Property Action Plan. Although the
Commission recognized that compulsory licenses are “to be used as a means
of last resort and a safety net,” it highlighted the broad flexibility that TRIPS
provides.274 It furthermore called on member states to pass “fast-track
procedures for issuing compulsory licenses in emergency situations”275 and
encouraged member states to coordinate with each other regarding the
duration of any licenses and the remuneration to be paid.276 The Commission
said that it would consider “the possibility of creating an emergency
co-ordination mechanism, to be triggered at short notice when Member
States consider issuing a compulsory license.”277
The EU has also committed to facilitating low-income countries’ use of
compulsory licensing during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Chair of the
European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade, Bernd Lange,
sent a letter to the EU Commissioner for Trade, Phil Hogan, noting that
low-income countries may need to utilize compulsory licensing to get
COVID-19 drugs and expressing concern that the EU’s recent free trade
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agreements might hinder such use. Hogan responded by reaffirming the
EU’s commitment to TRIPS flexibilities and the use of the Doha Declaration
for EU trade partners. He further noted that, if needed, the EU would be open
to changing its status under TRIPS Article 31bis to allow for the importation
of drugs produced by other countries under compulsory licenses.279
b. The Biden Administration
In October 2020, India and South Africa petitioned the WTO to permit
countries to waive IP rights related to fighting the COVID-19 pandemic.280
Many high-income countries were opposed at the time.281 In May 2021,
however, the Biden administration announced support for waiving IP
protection for COVID-19 vaccines.282 U.S. Trade Representative Katherine
Tai noted that “the extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic
call for extraordinary measures” and expressed support for expanding
vaccine manufacturing and distribution.283
Under pressure, the EU submitted its own three-element WTO proposal.
First, it called on governments to ensure COVID-19-related drugs and their
components can freely cross borders—something that the United States had
278
Letter from Bernd Lange, Chair of the Eur. Parliament Comm. on Int’l Trade, to Phil Hogan,
Trade Comm’r of the Eur. Comm’n (May 14, 2020), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/207560/
D(2020)15256_Lange%20to%20Commissioner%20Hogan%20on%20IPR-1.pdf.
279
Letter from Phil Hogan, supra note 37. See also Thiru Balasubramaniam, EU Trade
Commissioner Phil Hogan Issues Statement on European Union Compulsory Licensing in Context of
COVID-19, Makes Important Statement About TRIPS Article 31bis, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (June
3, 2020), https://www.keionline.org/33284 (noting that Hogan’s statement about the EU’s willingness to
revisit its opt-out of Article 31 is significant due to the uncertainty of whether opted-out countries could
reverse course).
280
Communication from India and South Africa, Waiver from Certain Provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of Covid-19, ¶ 12, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/669
(Oct. 2, 2020). Note that talks regarding the waiver are currently stalled. Alex Lawson, WTO Nominee
Sees Vaccine IP Waiver Talks as ‘Sort of Stuck’, LAW360 (Oct. 26, 2021), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1434276.
281
See Ann Danaiya Usher, South Africa and India Push for COVID-19 Patents Ban, LANCET (Dec.
5, 2020), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)32581-2/fulltext (discussing
the opposition, in late 2020, from high-income countries, including the United States, United Kingdom,
and EU member states).
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of the President, Statement from Ambassador Katherine Tai on the Covid-19 Trips Waiver (May 5,
2021), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/may/statement-ambassadorkatherine-tai-covid-19-trips-waiver (supporting the waiver of IP protections for COVID-19 vaccines).
See also Sapna Kumar, WTO Global Health: Shifting Away from a Punishment Mindset, PATENTLY-O
(May 9, 2021), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2021/05/shifting-punishment-mindset.html (discussing the
Biden administration’s support for a COVID-19 waiver).
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hindered. Second, it “call[ed] on governments to strongly encourage and
support vaccine manufacturers and developers to expand production and
ensure the affordable supply of vaccines to low- and middle-income
countries,” through methods including licensing agreements, tiered pricing
for lower-income countries, and the sharing of expertise.285 Third, it called
for facilitating the use of compulsory licensing under TRIPS.286
The slow pace for dealing with IP rights and drug access once a
pandemic arises highlights a need for countries to plan for drug shortages
before they occur. Part V makes suggestions for how the United States can
better streamline compulsory licensing and make it work for more complex
drugs, including vaccines.
V. COMPULSORY LICENSING AS A TOOL FOR PROTECTING U.S.
PUBLIC HEALTH
During the COVID-19 pandemic, a surge in demand for treatments and
vaccines led to widespread shortages and rationing. Notwithstanding the
crisis, pharmaceutical companies were under no obligation to license out
their technology to third parties to increase supply. Although compulsory
licensing under TRIPS Article 31 can be helpful in such situations, it does
not compel companies to share the know-how needed to produce
complicated drugs. Section A examines differences in the efficacy of
compulsory licensing for small-molecule drugs versus more complex
biologic drugs, and explains why know-how is important for producing
vaccines. Section B proposes that Congress pass legislation facilitating the
use of compulsory licensing, and that the government require federal
funding recipients to out-license patents, technology, and know-how when
drug shortages arise.
A. Compulsory Licensing for Small-Molecule Drugs Versus Biologic Drugs
Small-molecule drugs comprise ninety percent of global drug sales.287
They are manufactured through chemical synthesis, typically taken orally as
pills or tablets, and work within the cells in the body.288 The production of
small-molecule drugs can be scaled up, making it possible to produce them
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in large quantities. It is relatively straight-forward to create generic forms
of small-molecule drugs in different manufacturing conditions, given that
the active ingredient is generally a unique molecule reproduceable through
a predictable chemical process.290 So long as the generic manufacturer can
show that a generic drug contains the same active ingredient and is a
bioequivalent of the approved reference drug, and that its manufacturing
facility meets various standards, regulators can assume that the generic drug
shares the same safety and efficacy features.291
Biological products or “biologics” are narrowly defined as large-molecule
drugs derived from living organisms.292 Broader definitions characterize them
as any drug comprised of biologically-derived material,293 including all
vaccines.294 Biologics are typically injected or taken intravenously to interact in
the bloodstream or on the surface of the cells, rather than within the cells.295
Because they are derived from living organisms and are structurally complex,296
they are far more difficult to produce than small-molecule drugs.297
Biologics do not have truly identical generic counterparts—“biosimilars”
are similar, but not completely identical, to an existing biologic.298 Because
small manufacturing process changes can cause side effects in patients,
biologics are difficult to replicate and must go through rigorous testing to
ensure both safety and efficacy.299 Moreover, unlike with small-molecule
289
Thomas Morrow & Linda Hull Felcone, Defining the Difference: What Makes Biologics Unique,
BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE, Sept. 2004, at 24, 26 (comparing the production of small-molecule
drugs with biologics).
290
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292
See Morrow & Felcone, supra note 289, at 25 (discussing various definitions of biologic drugs).
293
Id.
294
See 21 C.F.R. § 600.3(h) (2021) (classifying all vaccines as “biological product[s]”).
295
Small Molecules, Large Biologics and the Biosimilar Debate, supra note 288.
296
Wang, supra note 287 (“A biologic drug is a substance that is extracted from, semi-synthesized
by, or manufactured in living organisms.”).
297
See Morrow & Felcone, supra note 289, at 26 (discussing the difficulty of scaling up biologic
production).
298
See Biosimilar and Interchangeable Biologics: More Treatment Choices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/biosimilar-and-interchangeable-biologics-more
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drugs, there is no one test that can prove a biosimilar is equivalent to its
reference biologic.300 These technical and regulatory challenges mean that
bringing a biosimilar to market can be time-consuming.301
Although small-molecule drugs and biologics are subject to the same
level of U.S. patent protection, they receive differing levels of data
protection under the Hatch-Waxman Act.302 Patent holders for new
small-molecule drugs are provided with five years of data exclusivities that
prevent competitors from utilizing the patent holder’s clinical data for the
purpose of gaining regulatory approval, which can be extended to eight years
if a new indication is found.303 Only after that period can the FDA begin to
review applications from potential generic manufacturers, leading to a
longer de facto period of protection.304 Biologics, by contrast, enjoy twelve
years of data exclusivity based on a theory that biologics are more
time-consuming to bring to market.305 Note that there is no waiver to data
exclusivity provisions under U.S. law or TRIPS.
These differences mean that the utility of compulsory licensing during
public health emergencies varies based on drug type. Compulsory licensing
is a valuable tool for producing small-molecule drugs because, even without
know-how, a generic manufacturer may be able to replicate a drug quickly.
For example, remdesivir is regarded as a more complex small-molecule
drug, given that its production requires a series of sequential steps.306 Yet,
as mentioned above, it was quickly replicated and produced by others.

exactly mimicking the molecular structure of the original biological product” as a hurdle to the creation
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300
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exclusivity for new small molecule drugs, with an additional three years for new indications.”). Note that
orphan drugs are eligible for a seven-year data exclusivity. Id.
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Reed F. Beall, Thomas J. Hwang & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Pre-Market Development Times for
Biologic Versus Small-Molecule Drugs, 37 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 708, 709 (2019) (noting the U.S.
data exclusivity for small-molecule drugs is, in practice, closer to seven years, given that the FDA may
not begin reviewing an application from a generic competitor until the five-year period ends). Note that
a generic manufacturer may submit an application after four years if it can certify that its products do not
infringe on the patents of the reference drug or if it can establish the patents at issue are invalid. 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(ii); Brennan, Kapczynski, Monahan & Rizvi, supra note 61, at 342.
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Note that at least one study has called this assumption into question. See Beall, Hwang &
Kesselheim, supra note 304, at 709 (noting that data suggests that “development times for biologics are
similar to, or possibly somewhat shorter than, for small-molecule drugs”).
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See Andrew Joseph, Gilead’s Remdesivir Has Seen Success Against the Coronavirus. Now the
Company Has to Make Enough to Supply the World, STAT (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.statnews.com
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For biologics such as vaccines, however, compulsory licensing is not
useful in the short term. There is no legal mechanism under TRIPS or U.S.
law for requiring a patent holder to turn over know-how for producing drugs,
and reverse-engineering alone is not sufficient for creating biosimilars.307
This can make developing biosimilars a time-consuming and expensive
process.308 Consequently, any legislative reform to alleviate vaccine
shortages must address know-how, given that a compulsory license alone
may not be sufficient to quickly develop and deploy a biosimilar.
B. Reforming Compulsory Licensing in the United States
Current U.S. law is inadequate for dealing with pandemic-related drug
shortages. Neither 28 U.S.C. § 1498 nor the Bayh-Dole Act require the
government to license a drug to a suitable manufacturer during a public
health emergency. Third parties cannot petition for a compulsory license for
an invention that was not government-funded. The government has never
granted a license under the Bayh-Dole Act, and even if it did, the license
would not take effect until the patent holder exhausted all available
appeals.309 Federal reform is needed in two areas. First, Congress needs to
make it easier for third parties to obtain compulsory licenses to alleviate drug
shortages. Second, when government-funded medical research results in a
patented drug, that drug should be subject to an out-licensing requirement
that triggers automatically in the event of drug scarcity.
1. Third-Party Compulsory License Requests
Congress should pass legislation requiring the government to grant a
compulsory license if a shortage of a patented drug arises and is detrimental
to public health, regardless of whether the drug was government-funded. To
achieve this, Congress could place an affirmative obligation on the Secretary
of HHS to ensure an adequate supply of needed drugs. In the event of a
shortage that is detrimental to public health, the Secretary would be
obligated to produce the drug or seek bids from suitable drug manufacturers
to produce it.

/2020/04/30/gileads-remdesivir-has-seen-success-against-the-coronavirus-now-the-company-has-tomake-enough-to-supply-the-world/ (discussing the complexity of manufacturing remdesivir).
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See W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition and
Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1028 (2016) (discussing the challenges that trade secrecy poses to
biosimilar manufacturing).
308
For example, in 2013, an Indian court authorized a third-party drug manufacturer, Biocon, to
develop a biosimilar to Roche’s patented biologic, trastuzumab. Cinthia Leite Frizzera, Borges Bognar,
Brittany L. Bychkovsky & Gilberto de Lima Lopes Jr., Compulsory Licensing for Cancer Drugs: Does
Circumventing Patent Rights Improve Access to Oncology Medications?, 2 J. GLOB. ONCOLOGY 292,
295 (2016). Although Biocon was able to create a biosimilar by January 2014, it was forced to conduct
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One problem with traditional compulsory licensing is the time that it can
take to reverse-engineer a drug, particularly for biologics. To overcome this,
the level of compensation to the patent holder could be set based on its
willingness to cooperate. If a patent holder shares manufacturing know-how
with a third-party producer, then the government would pay a reasonable
royalty that comes as close as possible to fully compensating the patent
holder. If the patent holder does not share this information, then
compensation would be set to the minimum amount required under TRIPS
Article 31. This provides pharmaceutical companies with a financial
incentive to prevent drug shortages and discourages rent-seeking behavior
during public health crises.
Another problem under current law is that the government refuses to
grant licenses notwithstanding drug shortages. Consequently, Congress
should provide a citizen-standing provision in compulsory licensing
legislation. Congress could permit third parties to sue HHS in federal court
to compel it to issue a license to a suitable manufacturer. Constitutional
standing requirements could be satisfied by a manufacturer able and willing
to produce the drug at issue.310
This approach offers several improvements over current law. It would
provide a way to compel the government to act when a drug shortage arises.
In 2020, had such legislation existed, it would have forced Gilead Sciences
to license remdesivir earlier and to more manufacturers, which would have
lessened the shortage. The new provision would still reward the patent
holder for its invention—money that the patent holder would not have
received had the shortage been allowed to persist or if the government had
utilized march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act. It would also encourage
patent holders to proactively seek out third-party licensing agreements on
their own terms before a shortage arises to avoid government intervention.
2. Out-Licensing Requirement
Whenever the government funds medical research, it should
contractually require the funding recipient to produce any resulting drug in
a sufficient quantity to meet public health needs. If a public health
emergency arises or a shortage otherwise threatens public health, a patent
holder would be required to utilize out-licensing to third-party
manufacturers to keep pace with demand after an initial grace period. Failure
to share manufacturing know-how could trigger steep penalties for the patent
holder or its exclusive licensee.
Pharmaceutical companies already utilize out-licensing to supply drugs
to some countries. As discussed earlier, Gilead Sciences voluntarily licensed
310

See Sapna Kumar, Standing Against Bad Patents, 32 BERKELEY TECH . L.J. 87, 108–111
(2017) (discussing constitutional standing requirements for suing an agency under the Administrative
Procedure Act).
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remdesivir to generic manufacturers in several countries to supply to mostly
low- and mid-income countries.311 Merck & Co voluntarily granted a
royalty-free license to its new COVID-19 antiviral drug to 105 low- and
middle-income countries for the duration of the public health emergency.312
Such behavior is not limited to pandemics:313 pharmaceutical companies are
generally willing to license their drugs because lower-income countries
comprise only a tiny percentage of the global pharmaceutical market,314 and
doing so may stave off future compulsory licensing.315
Less common, however, is the use of out-licensing to increase drug
supply or alleviate shortages in high-income countries. The Biden
administration helped secure an arrangement in which Merck & Co
repurposed existing manufacturing facilities to produce J&J’s COVID-19
vaccine.316 President Biden announced that he invoked the DPA to help
secure equipment, machinery, and supplies needed to produce vaccines.317
This agreement shows that the government can use existing tools to
address drug shortages, but it also highlights problems. First, it requires the
government to act proactively to address current or imminent drug shortages,
which did not occur under the Trump administration.318 Second, it requires the
cooperation of the patent holder. The Biden administration had no way to
compel J&J to share manufacturing know-how with third parties if it refused
311

Bauman, supra note 182.
News Release, Merck & Co., The Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) and Merck Enter into License
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to cooperate, even though J&J received vaccine development funding. Had
the government relied upon march-in rights, that would have led to a lengthy
delay before a biosimilar could be created and FDA-approved.320
By contrast, an out-licensing provision could reduce transaction costs,
and reduce barriers to quickly scaling up needed drugs. Such a provision
could automatically activate in the event of a declared public health
emergency or if a drug shortage arises, preventing the relevant
pharmaceutical company from refusing to license out relevant technology.
It would be obligated to work with third-party manufacturers to share
know-how needed to successfully produce the drug. The contract would also
provide a means for calculating royalty rates to facilitate payment to the
patent holder. The fact that the terms would be pre-negotiated is important,
because it would reduce deadly delays in scaling up drug production.
A major benefit of using contractual provisions is the flexibility that they
provide. Congress would not need to pass a statute for a federal agency to
change its licensing terms. Researchers who are unwilling to accept the
terms could refuse government funding. The government could choose to
use out-licensing provisions for pandemic-specific funding, for particular
classes of drug research, or for all medical research.
Out-licensing has potential utility beyond pandemics. For example, a drug
shortage on Genzyme’s Fabrazyme drug lasted for more than a year.321 During
this time, Fabry disease patients received only thirty percent of their usual drug
dose, which harmed several patients.322 Patients petitioned the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) to exercise march-in rights.323 But, although
Genzyme repeatedly missed production targets, the NIH maintained that it
would take too long for another manufacturer to produce the drug and gain
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See Alex Keown, J&J Secures Additional $1 Billion in Funding for COVID-19 Vaccine,
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from BARDA).
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See Price & Rai, supra note 307, at 1028 (discussing difficulties in reverse engineering biologics
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See Andrew Pollack, Genzyme Drug Shortage Leaves Users Feeling Betrayed, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
15, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/business/16genzyme.html (discussing how production
problems from Genzyme led to a shortage of the Fabrazyme drug).
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regulatory approval.
Had an out-licensing provision been in place,
Genzyme would have been obligated to work with other manufacturers to
scale up production.
Out-licensing will admittedly not solve all drug shortages. Inadequate
global drug manufacturing capacity and shortages of raw materials also
drive drug scarcity.325 However, an out-licensing requirement would place
the government in a better position to address future pandemic-related drug
shortages, and it would balance providing an incentive for pharmaceutical
companies to develop new drugs while reducing the risk of drug shortages.
VI. CONCLUSION
The same patent laws that help spur innovation hinder the rapid
production and dissemination of lifesaving drugs during public health
emergencies. Shortages of remdesivir and COVID-19 vaccines have caused
high-income countries to reassess their attitudes towards compulsory
licensing. However, although the Biden administration has taken a more
proactive stance on combating drug shortages by using the DPA, it is
dependent upon time-consuming negotiations and lacks a means for
compelling uncooperative pharmaceutical companies.
Several measures should be taken to prevent future drug shortages. First,
Congress should streamline the process for third parties seeking compulsory
licenses and require funding agencies to issue licenses in the event of drug
shortages that harm public health. Congress should furthermore allow third
parties to petition for a license even if a drug was not government-funded.
Second, funding agencies should utilize contractual provisions that tie
government funding to out-licensing requirements for drugs. These dormant
provisions could trigger in the event of a public health emergency
declaration or during a drug shortage. Negotiating the terms of an out-license
in advance would speed up the process when a shortage does emerge. The
government would gain the ability to compel unwilling pharmaceutical
companies to share know-how protected under trade secrecy law that is
currently not subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 or the Bayh-Dole Act. Had such
provisions been in place in 2020, the drug shortages that the United States
experienced could have been greatly alleviated.
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